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Against the backdrop of the move to an inflation targeting monetary policy framework 
beginning 2014 with consumer price index (CPI) inflation as the nominal anchor, this 
paper revisits monetary transmission dynamics. Rather than confining to the typical 
three equation New Keynesian model, this paper assesses transmission in a broader, 
disaggregated model incorporating external sector, fiscal policy, banking sector and 
financial market variables to capture the interactions among key macroeconomic 
policies and macroeconomic aggregates. The empirical analysis confirms the role of 
monetary policy in containing demand and inflationary pressures. In view of the 
ongoing structural reforms, deregulation and opening up of the Indian economy, as 
well as ongoing initiatives in the monetary policy operating framework to improve the 
efficacy of monetary transmission, the transmission dynamics can be expected to 
evolve over time.  
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I. Introduction 
The Reserve Bank of India transited from the multiple indicator approach 
towards a flexible inflation targeting (FIT) framework of monetary policy in 2014 (RBI, 
2014 and 2015). This arrangement was formalised initially by the monetary policy 
framework agreement between the Government and the Reserve Bank in February 
2015 (Government of India, 2016), and subsequently through amendments to the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act in 2016 (RBI, 2016). Consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation is the nominal anchor under the new framework. The Reserve Bank is 
mandated with the objective of keeping CPI inflation over the medium-term at 4 per 
cent, within a band of +/- 2 per cent, while supporting growth. Prior to this shift in 2014, 
the conduct and formulation of monetary policy was anchored on movements in 
wholesale price index (WPI) inflation. Given the monetary policy focus on WPI inflation 
in the pre-2014 period, available studies of monetary transmission in India have 
empirically assessed transmission using WPI inflation (for example, Patra and Kapur, 
2012a; Kapur and Behera, 2012).  
With the shift towards CPI inflation based FIT, assessing monetary 
transmission mechanism in terms of CPI inflation assumes importance.  In a FIT 
                                                          
1 Director, Monetary Policy Department, Reserve Bank of India. The views expressed in the 
paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the institution to which he belongs. 
Inputs and suggestions from Harendra Behera and Joice John and assistance from Sachin 
Tade are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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regime, inflation forecasts take the role of an intermediate target. Accordingly, an 
understanding of the CPI-based inflation process and its drivers is important for timely 
and reliable forecasts of inflation. Given the monetary policy transmission lags, the 
forecasts of inflation and output are, in turn, key inputs to the forward-looking monetary 
policy. The related aspects such as the size of the exchange rate pass-through, the 
sacrifice ratio, and the lags with which monetary policy impacts demand and output 
are also critical.  This paper undertakes an assessment of these issues in the context 
of an estimated New Keynesian macro model of the Indian economy, building upon 
earlier studies.  
While the typical monetary transmission studies in the Indian context have used 
variants of the compact three-equation New Keynesian model or a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework, this paper assesses transmission in a broader 
modelling framework incorporating external sector (current account balance and 
capital flows), fiscal policy, banking sector (credit growth and asset quality) and 
financial market variables (exchange rate and yield on government bonds) to 
adequately capture the interaction and feedback among the various macroeconomic 
policies and macroeconomic aggregates. Moreover, the paper assesses inflation 
dynamics separately for food, fuel and core inflation, and similarly, output dynamics 
are assessed separately for its major constituents (industry, services and agriculture). 
Such a richer, disaggregated modelling framework can better capture the inter-
linkages across sectors and thus provide a fuller assessment of the policy trade-offs. 
The paper’s empirical analysis confirms the role of monetary policy in 
containing demand and inflationary pressures. The monetary policy effects on output 
and inflation are modest, consistent with the existing cross-country and Indian 
evidence. This suggests that a forward-looking monetary policy can be more effective 
in achieving its objectives and anchoring inflation expectations at a lower cost vis-a-
vis the case of delayed monetary actions – the latter approach might need a stronger 
monetary policy response especially if inflation expectations get unhinged. A tight 
monetary policy and low inflation is also found to have a stabilising impact on fiscal 
dynamics. The model’s forecasting performance improves as the forecast horizon 
increases from the short-term (one quarter ahead) to the medium-term (eight quarters 
ahead), which is desirable from a policy perspective and also suggests that the inter-
linkages in the model and its general equilibrium nature add value to the partial 
analysis inherent in single-equation approaches. A stylised fact of the conduct of 
monetary policy across major central banks is the inertia in the process of changes in 
the policy rate (“baby steps” approach). A comparative analysis of monetary policy 
rules on the appropriate degree of inertia suggests that a less inertial rule has the 
benefit of minimising deviations of inflation and output from the policy objectives, but 
such a rule would also require stronger monetary policy responses to any shocks 
which lead inflation and output to deviate from their policy objectives.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. This introductory section is followed by 
an overview of the transmission channels, with a focus on both cross-country and 
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Indian empirical evidence (Section II). The paper’s modelling approach, the model 
structure and data issues are set out in Section III. Empirical results are presented and 
discussed in Section IV. Model’s forecasting performance, properties and simulations 
are covered and analysed in section V. In view of the regime shift towards a CPI-based 
framework in 2014, empirical estimates of the monetary policy reaction function based 
on historical data are challenging and therefore, the model dynamics are also 
assessed using monetary policy rules from a couple of recent studies.  Section VI 
concludes the paper. 
II. Monetary Transmission: An Overview 
There are four key channels, though not mutually exclusive, of monetary 
transmission: (a) interest rate channel; (b) quantum channel relating to credit; (c) asset 
price channel; and (d) exchange rate channel (Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin, 2011; 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The relative importance of each channel may differ over 
time and across economies, depending upon factors such as the degree of 
monetisation of the economy, the extent to which households borrow from the formal 
financial system, the state of development of financial markets, the instruments 
available to monetary policy, the fiscal stance and the degree of openness. In the 
context of very low policy rates in the US during the early 2000s and in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis, a “risk-taking” channel has also been floated, i.e., the 
interest rate policy and monetary policy stance affects not just the quantity of bank 
credit, but also its quality (Acharya et al., 2015, Borio and Zhu, 2008; Dell’Ariccia et 
al., 2016). Too low interest rates for too long in the period prior to the crisis are believed 
to have helped fuel an asset price boom, spurring financial intermediaries to increase 
leverage and take on excessive risks. This channel remains pertinent today as interest 
rates remain lower than the pre-2007 period in major advanced economies (and 
negative in some cases). 
Cross-country empirical evidence, largely based on vector autoregression 
(VAR) analysis, indicates that: (a) monetary policy impacts growth and inflation with 
long and variable lags; and, (b) he impact is sensitive to estimation approaches, 
assumptions and sample periods and may have become less effective since the 1990s 
(Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Christiano et al., 1999; Coibion, 2012; Ramey, 2016) 
(see Annex I for a detailed survey of the findings). 
Greater insights into the black box of transmission can be obtained by an 
analysis of the key pillars of the transmission mechanism, i.e., drivers of inflation, 
demand/output and monetary policy reaction function. Such an approach is more 
appropriate, given this paper’s objective of understanding transmission dynamics 
among the various macroeconomic policy instruments and variables. Accordingly, a 
brief overview of recent literature in this sphere is discussed next2.  
                                                          
2 This Section partly draws upon the more exhaustive review of the earlier literature in Patra 
and Kapur (2012a), and Kapur and Behera (2012), and more recent reviews of inflation 
dynamics in Behera, Wahi and Kapur (2017), and output/demand dynamics in Wahi and Kapur 
(2018). 
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Inflation Dynamics 
Analysis of inflation formation and determination in a Phillips curve framework 
continues to be a key ingredient of understanding monetary transmission. It has 
attracted more interest since 2008, given the puzzling inflation behaviour (the 
phenomenon of missing deflation in 2009-10 and missing inflation since 2015) even 
as there have been sharp and sizable movements in the unemployment rate (large 
increase during 2009-10 and a sustained decline by 2018 to under 4 per cent, well-
below its previous estimates of the natural rate). A number of alternative explanations 
have been offered for this inflation behaviour: stable inflation expectations and a flatter 
Phillips curve (Blanchard et al., 2015); relatively moderate decline in short-term 
unemployment rate (as it matters more for inflation than the overall unemployment 
rate) (Ball and Mazumder, 2015); inflation expectations of households (which are more 
volatile and elevated) matter and not the relatively stable expectations of financial 
markets (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015); the Phillips curve might be convex, with 
the response of inflation to demand conditions being quite muted during recessions 
vis-à-vis expansions (Gross and Semmler, 2017); and, not only domestic but global 
factors need to be factored in appropriately (Bobeica and Jarocinski, 2017). Thus, 
notwithstanding the missing deflation/inflation puzzle, the “US Phillips curve is alive 
and well (or at least as well as it has been in the past)”, but its inability to fully explain 
inflation dynamics as well as its flattening “raises serious challenges for monetary 
policy in the future” (Blanchard, 2016; pp. 31 and 34). The flattening of the Phillips 
curve has important policy implications: “to the extent that the unemployment gap has 
a smaller effect on inflation, monetary policy rules should put relatively more weight 
on the unemployment gap relative to inflation. Trying to stabilize inflation may require 
very large movements in the unemployment gap” (Blanchard et al., 2015). 
In the context of a market determined exchange rate and large volatility in 
capital flows, an assessment of exchange rate pass-through to inflation is critical for 
inflation management. The magnitude of exchange rate pass-through depends upon 
a number of factors: monetary policy framework, degree of anchoring of inflation 
expectations, share of imports in the consumption basket, currency of invoicing and 
pricing behaviour of firms. Improvements in the credibility of monetary frameworks is 
believed to have led to declines in pass-through coefficients over the past two 
decades. Estimates of pass-through coefficients are typically higher in emerging and 
developing economies compared to advanced economies, inter alia, on account of the 
less anchored inflation expectations in the former group of countries: the average 
pass-through coefficient (after 4 quarters) is estimated to be 0.2 for emerging Asian 
countries, 0.3 for Latin American countries and 0.5 for emerging European countries 
vis-à-vis 0.1 for advanced economies (IMF, 2016b). BIS (2016) also reports broadly 
similar pass-through coefficients (around 0.1 for advanced economies and around 0.2 
for emerging economies).  
The import content of final household consumption expenditure provides one 
benchmark to assess the pass-through coefficients across countries: a pass-through 
coefficient above this benchmark can be indicative of second-round effects and a weak 
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anchoring of inflation expectations. The import content ratio is estimated to be around 
0.25 for the group of advanced economies and slightly below 0.2 for the three 
emerging groups noted earlier. These import ratios, in conjunction with the estimated 
pass-through coefficients, indicate the presence of second-round effects in Latin 
American EMEs and especially in emerging Europe, and, in contrast, well-anchored 
inflation expectations in advanced economies. Whereas the IMF (2016b) reports 
evidence of some decline in pass-through coefficients since 2011 attributable, inter 
alia, to more credible monetary frameworks, BIS (2016) finds some evidence of an 
uptrend in the pass-through attributable to larger and more persistent exchange rate 
shocks in the period since 2011-12. 
The pass-through is, however, a complex phenomenon and could be reflecting 
factors other than the imports share. For example, according to Gopinath (2015), 
international prices, in their currency of invoicing, are not very sensitive to exchange 
rates at horizons of up to two years. Given the US dollar’s domination as invoicing 
currency in world trade, the US inflation is more insulated from exchange rate shocks, 
while other countries are highly sensitive to it. Another view articulated by Forbes 
(2015) posits that the exchange rate’s impact on consumer inflation as well as import 
prices is neither consistent across time, nor related to import intensity of the respective 
sectors of the economy; what may matter is the nature of the initial exchange rate 
shock (for example, demand v/s supply shock, or domestic v/s global shock, as is the 
case with assessment of oil shocks and their impact on the economy). Exchange rate 
impact can be non-linear: employing big data for euro area, Lewis (2016) estimates 
that the pass-through of larger exchange rate movements (defined as year-on-year 
changes of more than 5 per cent) at 0.75, almost five-times the pass-through 
coefficient of 0.16 for smaller exchange rate movements. On the other hand, Bergset 
and Vonen (2016) are not able to find a conclusive evidence in favour of a non-linear 
pass-through for Norway, although they find some evidence for a larger pass-through 
for a persistent depreciation vis-à-vis temporary depreciation. 
Demand and Output Dynamics 
For a sample of G-7 countries, neither the backward-looking nor the forward-
looking specifications of the pure IS curve yield a negative (and significant) impact of 
real interest rates on output gap (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2005). This could be due to 
the simultaneity bias in the estimation (a forward-looking monetary policy might be 
responding to the expected output gap, which could impart a downward bias to the 
coefficient on the interest rate in the IS curve) or due to omitted variables (such as 
long-term interest rates, exchange rate, money supply, asset prices and external 
demand) that also impact demand. Indeed, in the specifications augmented with 
property prices (as an indicator of wealth effects), the coefficient on the real interest 
rate turns out to be negative and significant, solving the IS puzzle: the point estimates 
suggest that an increase of 100 bps in the real interest rate reduces output by 6-17 
bps with a lag of one quarter. The estimates in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for 
the US suggest that a 100 bps increase in the federal funds rate, sustained for 2 years, 
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reduces output by 40 bps after 2 years and by 66 bps after 3 years. Hafer and Jones 
(2008) find a negative and significant coefficient on real interest rate for the G-7 
countries only when they augment the IS curve with a monetary aggregate, thereby 
suggesting that monetary models without money are either premature at best or 
misguided at worst.  
The New Keynesian paradigm takes the expected path of short-term interest 
rates, with essentially no direct role for long-term interest rates, as the relevant interest 
rate (Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003; Kiley, 2014). In contrast, older large-scale 
macroeconomic models, such as the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model, provide an 
additional role for long-term interest rates and term/risk premium on demand and 
output dynamics. For the US, the evidence suggests that the short-term interest rate 
has a larger influence on economic activity vis-à-vis the long-term rates through its 
impact on the entire term structure (Kiley, 2014). 
Volatile crude oil prices can have a sizable impact on demand, especially for 
large net oil importers like India, through the discretionary income and terms of trade 
channels as well as the cost channel (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). A reduction of 40 
per cent in real crude oil prices (with the decline moderating to round 20 per cent five 
years after the initial shock) could increase global output growth by around one 
percentage point in the first two years (assuming a full pass-through from the 
international crude oil prices to domestic prices of petroleum products). Amongst major 
countries, the peak estimated impact on GDP growth (assuming full pass-through) is 
around one percentage point in US as well as India, around 40 bps in the euro area 
and close to 2 percentage points in China (IMF, 2015a).  
Monetary Policy Reaction Function  
Cross-country estimates of monetary policy reaction functions - drawing upon 
Taylor (1993), and its refinements, for example, in Clarida et al. (2000) - indicate a 
high degree of inertia in the policy rates (coefficient of around 0.85 or more on the 
lagged interest rate term). This inertia may be due to some omitted variables from the 
reaction function and which might be quite persistent (Rudebusch, 2006) or may reflect 
the central bank’s desire to smoothen the interest rate changes so as to minimise 
potential volatility in financial markets from large, abrupt changes (Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012). The interest rate smoothing can also be an outcome of a 
complicated strategic interplay between the central bank and the bond market that 
arises when the former has some private information about its long-run target for the 
policy rate and is averse to bond-market volatility (Stein and Sunderam, 2016).  
Exchange Rate and External Sector   
In the context of extended period of unconventional monetary policies in the 
major advanced economies, the impact of exchange rate movements on net exports, 
and output has attracted renewed interest. Model estimates for the US suggest that a 
10 per cent permanent appreciation of the US dollar leads to a reduction of 1-1.5 per 
cent (after three years) in the US GDP, an improvement of around 1.5 per cent (of 
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GDP) in net exports and an increase in core inflation of around 50 bps after 2 quarters 
(Fischer, 2015). The analysis in IMF (2015b), covering both advanced and emerging 
market and developing economies, also suggests sizable effects of exchange rate 
movements on trade volumes: a 10 per cent real effective depreciation is associated 
with a rise in real net exports of, on average, 1.5 percent of GDP (with substantial 
cross-country variation of 0.5-3.1 per cent), and much of the adjustment occurs in the 
first year. In view of the increased role of global value chains, there has been some 
weakening of the relationship between exchange rates and trade volumes for some 
economies and products, but little evidence of a generalised disconnect between 
exchange rates and external trade as the bulk of global trade still consists of 
conventional trade. On the other hand, according to Ahmed et al. (2015), participation 
in global value chains reduces the exchange rate elasticity of manufacturing exports 
by 22 percent, on average, with greater effect on countries with higher participation in 
supply chains.  
The growth-boosting effect of currency depreciation through the trade channel 
could, however, get offset, partly or fully, in the presence of sizable foreign currency 
borrowings; currency depreciations could potentially cripple balance sheets, and 
curtail activity and overall output. According to BIS (2016), the balance sheet channel 
of exchange rate dominates the conventional growth-enhancing trade channel in the 
EMEs in the short-run; in the long-run, however, the net effect of depreciation on 
growth turns moderately positive, as the conventional trade channel offsets the drag 
from the risk-taking channel. On the other hand, for advanced economies, currency 
depreciation is found to boost growth both in the short- and long-run due, as the trade 
channel’s positive effects outweigh the negative effects from the balance sheet 
channel.  
Empirical Evidence: India  
Monetary transmission dynamics for the Indian economy have been studied in 
a number of studies using alternative approaches and these studies broadly 
corroborate the cross-country evidence reviewed above3. An assessment of monetary 
transmission in a new Keynesian framework indicates that an increase of 100 bps in 
the nominal policy rate leads to peak declines of 40 bps (with a lag of 2 quarters) in 
non-agricultural growth and 25 bps (lag of 5 quarters) in non-food manufactured 
products WPI inflation; the impact on output and inflation was found to be somewhat 
lower when real interest rate was used in lieu of nominal interest rate (Kapur and 
Behera, 2012). Using both firm-level and macroeconomic data, the analysis in RBI 
(2013) indicates that an increase of 100 bps in real interest rate leads to a reduction 
of about 50 bps in the investment rate and about 20 bps in GDP growth. 
On inflation dynamics, Patra et al. (2014) explore the sources of inflation 
persistence in India and find (a) supply side shocks in the form of relative price 
increases, particularly for food, influence aggregate prices lastingly, (b) an increase in 
                                                          
3 A brief survey of the findings of the VAR based and other studies on monetary transmission 
for India is presented in Annex II. 
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inflation persistence in the post-2008 period, (c) a high degree of interest rate 
smoothing imparts persistence to the inflation process. According to Sonna et al. 
(2014), higher real rural wages are the most dominant driver of food inflation. Though 
statistically significant, the minimum support price (MSP) policy and changing dietary 
habits in favour of protein items were not as over-bearing as generally perceived. 
Moreover, the introduction of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA) was not found to have caused any significant increase in food 
inflation as generally perceived. Exchange rate pass-through to inflation is asymmetric 
(with pass-through from small depreciations being the strongest) and has declined in 
recent years in an environment of low inflation and declining trade openness (Patra et 
al., 2018). Behera, Wahi and Kapur (2017) analyse inflation dynamics using sub-
national data for the new CPI series - the first paper to model the inflation process for 
the CPI itself (vis-à-vis a few studies, including this paper, focusing on the synthetic 
CPI). Their estimates suggest that, first, the Phillips curve for the CPI inflation is flatter 
than CPI for industrial workers (CPI-IW), indicating a higher sacrifice ratio for a given 
disinflation and, second, a somewhat lower exchange rate pass-through in the case 
of the CPI inflation vis-à-vis the CPI-IW inflation.  
Moving to the IS curve estimates, the output gap has become more persistent 
(indicative of sluggishness in the adjustment of aggregate demand to tightening 
structural rigidities and supply bottlenecks) and, the impact of the real policy rate on 
output has declined (Patra et al. (2017). Salunkhe and Patnaik (2018) focus on the IS 
curve dynamics for India, and confirm the findings of Patra and Kapur (2012a) on a 
backward-looking IS model fitting the data better vis-à-vis the hybrid model. Wahi and 
Kapur (2018) assess the impact of monetary policy and other macroeconomic 
determinants on economic activity using state-level data. Their integrated empirical 
framework confirms the role for a countercyclical monetary policy in stabilising 
economic activity and finds evidence of crowding-in for public investment and 
crowding-out of other fiscal spending.  
Overall, the survey of various studies, both India and cross-country, presented 
in this section indicates that monetary policy impacts output and inflation with lags, 
although there is a wide range of estimates on both the lags and the magnitude of the 
impact. Apart from methodological issues, the differences in findings across studies 
for a given country could also be on account of structural changes and financial 
innovations. Such factors can be more important for emerging economies, undergoing 
a fast pace of structural transformation and continued financial opening (both domestic 
and global) and deregulation. In India too, the reforms process initiated in the early 
1990s and still ongoing can impact transmission impulses over time. Monetary 
transmission in India also continues to grapple with rigidities emanating, for example, 
from high SLR, large fiscal deficits, administered interest rates on small savings, and 
delayed and incomplete pass-through from the central bank’s policy signals to 
commercial bank interest rates (Mohan 2009; RBI, 2014; RBI, 2017; Acharya, 2017). 
These rigidities have also attracted continuous policy initiatives, aimed specifically at 
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improving monetary transmission, which necessitate re-visiting empirics of monetary 
transmission on a regular basis, as indeed is the objective of this paper.  
 
III. Modelling Approach, Structure and Data 
Modelling Approach 
The dynamics of an economy can be empirically analysed through three 
alternative modelling approaches: VAR, DSGE, and structural econometric modelling 
approaches. Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The VAR 
approach is quite popular for assessing monetary transmission, and its focus on 
studying dynamics in response to exogenous monetary policy shocks is well-suited to 
avoid the endogeneity concerns. A severe limitation of this approach, by construction, 
is that it provides evidence only for the effect of monetary policy shocks, which account 
for a negligible share of overall interest rate movements, while nothing is learnt about 
the effect of the more important systematic monetary policy measures (Goodhart and 
Hofmann, 2005). Indeed, this issue is more relevant now, since true monetary shocks 
are rare given the more systematic approach to the conduct of monetary policy 
(Ramey, 2016). Residuals from the VAR regressions used to represent exogenous 
policy shocks often bear little resemblance to standard interpretations of the historical 
record of policy actions and the VAR residuals differ across specifications (Walsh, 
2010). Apart from this conceptual drawback, the VAR approach has other limitations: 
atheoretic; restricted ability to handle large variables in the context of short-sample 
periods; assumption of a backward-looking monetary policy reaction function; and, 
sensitivity to identifying assumptions.  
In contrast to the VAR approach, the DSGE models are rooted in theory and 
first principles. However, the strong equilibrating assumptions inherent in the DSGE 
models are debatable and can lead to misleading inferences, as noted by Goodfriend 
and King (2016) in their review of Riksbank’s monetary policy: The models “assumed 
that the inflation target had such credibility that small changes in current or expected 
future interest rates would enable the Riksbank to guide inflation back to the target in 
two years, irrespective of the underlying state of the world economy” (page 91). … 
“But during the period under review it didn’t” (page 84). The existing DSGE models 
are “seriously flawed” and need to become less insular and less imperialistic 
(Blanchard, 2018).  
An alternative to the DSGE and VAR approaches is the traditional structural 
econometric model (SEM) approach: structural in the sense of incorporating a good 
deal of economic theory, and econometric because this is how the equations are 
typically estimated/parameterised (Wren-Lewis, 2018). The SEM estimation approach 
has practical advantages over calibrated/DSGE models: better forecasting, being 
more driven by the historical properties of macroeconomic data; and, easier to use, 
adapt, and modify, given their reduced-form nature (Gervais and Gosselin, 2014). 
Therefore, the SEMs can be attractive to the policymakers by giving them confidence 
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that the model’s predictions are consistent with past evidence vis-à-vis the micro-
founded DSGE models (Wren-Lewis, 2018)4.  
Against this backdrop, this paper prefers the SEM approach to assess 
dynamics among key macroeconomic policies and macroeconomic aggregates. Given 
the complexity of the economy, no one model or modelling approach can be viewed 
as ideal in all aspects (Blanchard, 2018); accordingly, the modelling approach used in 
this paper should be seen as supplementing alternative approaches (calibrated/DSGE 
models and VAR studies) to draw more robust inferences.  
The paper undertakes this endeavour in the New Keynesian framework, 
augmented with external, financial and fiscal sectors to have a more holistic 
assessment of the macroeconomic dynamics and interactions. The three-equation 
core New Keynesian framework models the dynamics of aggregate demand (IS curve, 
which links demand conditions to interest rate and other factors), aggregate supply 
(Phillips curve, which links inflationary pressures to cost/demand conditions and other 
factors), and monetary policy reaction function (Taylor-like rule, which models interest 
rate responding to deviations of inflation and output from policy targets/objectives) 
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 1999 and 2000; Gali, 2008; Goodhart and Hoffman, 
2005; Taylor, 1993; Paez-Farrell, 2009). 
The pure New Keynesian model is fully forward-looking, but is not supported by 
the observed persistence in the data for a variety of reasons such as habit persistence, 
liquidity constrained households, and menu costs. Therefore, ad hoc modifications 
have necessitated hybrid versions of the model, i.e., both forward- and backward-
looking components (Gali and Gertler, 1999; Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2005).  
Even such hybrid specifications are subject to serious identification and 
misspecification issues, such as the use of lagged inflation as instruments for expected 
inflation in the NKPC; in practice, the NKPC  is simply a regression of inflation on its 
lags and the output gap (Rudd and Whelan, 2007; Gordon, 2013). As the exhaustive 
review by Mavroeidis et al. (2014) notes, seemingly innocuous specification changes 
lead to big differences in point estimates. For example, adding one lag of inflation to 
the NKPC tends to reduce the estimated coefficient on expected inflation by about 
0.25, while 4 lags of inflation reduce the coefficient by 0.50.  
Similarly, the available empirical evidence favours backward-looking IS curve. 
As Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003) note, the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
approach to estimating the forward-looking IS curve biases the coefficient on expected 
output gap towards 0.5, even though the true coefficient may be below/above 0.5; 
                                                          
4 “The response of most economists who use microfounded models to the idea that SEMs 
could be an alternative to DSGE models is normally very simple. SEMs are internally 
consistent only through luck and good judgement, are therefore subject to the Lucas critique, 
and therefore cannot produce valid policy conclusions. But the counterargument is 
straightforward. Microfounded models, because they are unable to match so much of the data 
(or at least much less than an SEM), are misspecified and therefore cannot produce valid 
policy conclusions. They are implicitly ignoring real world phenomena that we currently do not 
fully understand” (Wren-Lewis, 2018, pp.62). 
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also, the real interest rate has the expected negative and significant effect on output 
gap only in a backward-looking specification. The panel analysis for 22 OECD 
countries in Stracca (2010) indicates that the real interest rate turns out to be either 
insignificant or wrongly signed in forward-looking specifications. Furthermore, the use 
of backward-looking specifications may be more relevant from policy perspective, 
since many policymakers appear more comfortable with such a specification 
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). Backward-looking expectations may be particularly 
appropriate during the introduction of a new rule for inflation targeting; the assumption 
of rational expectations may be unrealistic during the transition period, when learning 
about the new policy rule is taking place. These observations seem all the more 
relevant in the Indian context in the wake of a regime shift in the conduct of monetary 
policy with the phased introduction of flexible inflation targeting, beginning early 2014. 
Building upon this stylised empirical evidence on the New Keynesian model, 
this paper extends the earlier work of Patra and Kapur (2012a) and Kapur and Behera 
(2012) in a number of directions. First, it takes a disaggregated approach to modelling 
the output dynamics. Separate equations are estimated for the three major sectors of 
the economy (viz. agriculture, industry and services output); further detail on the 
model’s structure and equations is presented later in this section. Second, on inflation 
dynamics, the behaviour of food, fuel and core inflation is also modelled separately, 
given their different drivers. As noted earlier, the focus is on understanding drivers of 
CPI inflation, whereas almost all earlier papers have focussed on determinants of WPI 
inflation. Third, this paper models exchange rate dynamics for a consistent 
understanding of the macroeconomic dynamics, while recognising that short-term 
exchange rate forecasting is beset with many challenges. Fourth, given the high trade 
and financial integration with the global economy, the behaviour of current account 
balance and capital flows is also studied. Fifth, drivers of key fiscal indicators (primary 
fiscal deficit and interest payments) as well as bond yields are explored. Finally, in the 
context of bank-dominated financial sector, the determinants of bank credit and asset 
quality are also examined.  
A calibrated model of the Indian economy has been recently developed in 
Benes et al. (2016) and the present paper contributes to further development and 
refining of such models. Compared to Benes et al. (2016), key additions of this paper 
are: disaggregated approach to assessing output dynamics; and, incorporation of 
fiscal, external and financial sector blocks.  
Model Structure 
First, following the IS curve framework, demand (output gap, ?̃?) is assumed to 
depend upon both domestic and external factors [real interest rate gap (?̃?), real non-
food bank credit gap (𝑟𝑛𝑓?̃?), monsoon conditions (deviation of actual rainfall from its 
normal level) (𝑟𝑎𝑖?̃?), real effective exchange rate gap (𝑟𝑒?̃?), external demand gap (?̃?𝑓), 
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and real domestic mineral oil prices gap5 (𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑙̃ )]6,7. Given the potentially different 
impact of these variables on industrial and services activity, separate equations are 
estimated for the output dynamics of these two sectors. In contrast, agricultural 
sector’s output dynamics are assumed to be determined only by rainfall dynamics, 
given the sector’s continued, albeit declining, dependence on the monsoon.  
 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛼1?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼2?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼3?̃?𝑡−𝑖
𝑓 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑒?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑟𝑎𝑖?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑙̃ 𝑡−𝑖+ 𝛼7𝑟𝑛𝑓?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑦
 
 
Second, drawing upon the Phillips curve approach, core inflation (𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) is 
modelled as a function of domestic demand conditions (overall output gap), inflation 
expectations, exchange rate movements (Rupees per US dollar) (∆𝑒), supply shocks 
[international crude oil prices in US dollar terms (∆𝑜𝑖𝑙)]. Inflation expectations, in turn, 
are assumed to have an inertial and adaptive component (proxied by lagged inflation) 
as well as a forward-looking component (anchored around central bank’s inflation 
target,𝜋𝑇). Food inflation (𝜋𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) is postulated to depend upon inflation expectations 
(a weighted average of lagged inflation and the inflation target, as in the case of core 
inflation), supply shocks [rainfall conditions, inflation in minimum support prices (𝜋𝑚𝑠𝑝), 
and global food inflation (𝜋𝑤𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑)]. Fuel inflation is related to its lag, the central bank’s 
inflation target and international crude oil prices. The inflation terms (lags and 
expected terms) are constrained to sum to unity for all the inflation equations in 
consonance with the postulate of no long-run trade-off between growth and inflation 
(i.e., a vertical long-run Phillips curve is imposed). 
 
 𝜋𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽1𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + (1 − 𝛽1)𝜋𝑡
𝑇 + 𝛽2?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽3∆𝑒𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽4∆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
 
 𝜋𝑡
𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 = 𝛽5𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 + (1 − 𝛽5)𝜋𝑡
𝑇 + 𝛽6𝑟𝑎𝑖?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽7𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑤𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽8𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑚𝑠𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑
 
 
𝜋𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 = 𝛽9𝜋𝑡−𝑖
𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 + (1 − 𝛽9)𝜋𝑡
𝑇 + 𝛽10∆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙
 
 
                                                          
5 As most of the sample period was marked by delayed and incomplete pass-through from 
international crude oil prices to domestic product prices and also due to occasional changes 
in the tax rates on the domestic product prices, the correlation between domestic product 
prices and international crude oil prices is weak. In order to better capture the impact of oil 
shocks on domestic demand and economic activity, movements in the WPI mineral oils index, 
rather than global crude oil prices, are taken as the explanatory variable in the IS curve 
regressions. 
6 Variables with tilde (~) on top are in gap form, calculated as deviation of actual from long-
term trend. 
7 Real variables have been obtained by deflating the relevant nominal variables with consumer 
price index (or consumer price inflation in the case of interest rates). The real effective 
exchange rate is taken from OECD database. 
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Third, for the monetary policy reaction function and the final equation of the 
core New Keynesian model, the nominal policy interest rate (i) is postulated to be 
driven by deviations of expected inflation and expected output from their respective 
targets/objectives and foreign policy interest rate (if). As elaborated later, an empirical 
assessment of this rule in terms of CPI inflation raises issues, since the monetary 
policy stance over most of the sample period was largely conditioned by movements 
in WPI inflation, although CPI inflation was monitored as a part of the multiple 
indicators approach.  
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+𝑖 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑇) + 𝛾4𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑙
 
 
Fourth, exchange rate movements (∆e) are postulated to be driven by relative 
inflation rates (Indian CPI inflation relative to the US inflation, ∆rp). The purchasing 
power parity (PPP) principle is assumed to hold in the long-run – the coefficients on 
the exchange rate and the relative inflation terms are, thus, restricted to sum to unity. 
In the short-run, given India’s increased external openness, deviations from the PPP 
can be sizable and persistent under the impact of volatile capital flows (kf) and volatility 
in global financial markets (vix) and therefore, these variables are also included 
amongst the explanatory variables. 
∆𝑒𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1 ∆𝑒𝑡−𝑖 + (1 −  𝜔1) ∆𝑟𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜔2 𝑘𝑓𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜔3 𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜔4 ∆𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑒 
 
Fifth, current account balance (as per cent to GDP) (cab) is modelled as driven 
by both domestic and global factors, while also taking into account India’s large 
dependence upon oil imports for its domestic needs [domestic growth (∆𝑦), real 
effective exchange rate (∆𝑟𝑒𝑟), global demand (yf), and global crude oil prices (∆oil)]. 
Sixth, for net capital flows (as per cent to GDP) (kf), both push and pull factors - 
domestic growth (∆𝑦𝑡), interest rate differentials (𝑖 − 𝑖
∗) and movements in the nominal 
exchange rate - are included as potential explanatory variables.  
𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑2∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑3∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑓 + 𝜑4∆𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑5∆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑏 
𝑘𝑓𝑡 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1𝑘𝑓𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜗2(𝑖 − 𝑖
∗)𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜗3∆𝑒𝑡 + 𝜗4∆𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘𝑓
 
Seventh, real non-food bank credit (∆rnfc), and banks’ non-performing assets 
(npa) are modelled as a function of economic activity, and real interest rate (r). Real 
oil prices (∆roil) are included to capture the impact of fluctuations in global crude prices 
on demand for bank credit from the domestic banking system.  
 
∆𝑟𝑛𝑓𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛿1∆𝑟𝑛𝑓𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛿2∆𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿3∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿4∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿5∆𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑓𝑐
 
 ∆𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛿6𝑟𝑛𝑓?̃?𝑡−1 +  𝛿7∆𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿8∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿9∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑛𝑓𝑐
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Eighth, the central government’s primary revenue deficit (prd) is assumed to be 
influenced by real economic activity (through its impact on government revenues) and 
inflation (through its impact on government expenditures). Given the administered 
nature of prices of domestic petroleum products over most of the sample period, there 
was incomplete pass-through from global crude oil prices to domestic prices, with 
implications for government’s deficit. Therefore, crude oil prices are also included as 
an explanatory variable. As excess/scanty rainfall impacts the agricultural and the rural 
sector and in turn potentially impacts government expenditures, rainfall is also 
included in the equation. Ninth, government’s interest payments (ip) are modelled as 
a function of the outstanding debt stock (liab) and movements in government bond 
yields (gs).  
𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡 = 𝜉0 + 𝜉1𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜉2∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜉3∆𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜉4𝜋𝑡 + 𝜉5𝑟𝑎𝑖?̃?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑑
 
𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜆2𝑔𝑠𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖𝑝
 
 
Finally, government bond yields are expected to be driven by monetary and 
liquidity measures [policy repo rate, cash reserve ratio (crr), statutory liquidity ratio 
(slr)], government’s financing needs (gross market borrowings, gmb), investments by 
non-residents in government bonds (fiidebt), foreign bond yields (𝑖∗), and crude oil 
prices. Crude oil prices are included to account for their possible impact on 
government’s deficit and borrowings in view of the earlier noted phenomenon of 
incomplete pass-through over the sample period. 
 ∆𝑔𝑠𝑡 = 𝜇0 +  𝜇1∆𝑔𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇2∆𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇3∆𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇4∆𝑠𝑙𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇5𝑔𝑚𝑏𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇6𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−𝑖 +
𝜇7∆𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝜇8∆𝑖
∗ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑔𝑠
 
 
Data 
All-India CPI inflation data are available from 2010 onwards only; following 
Benes et al. (2016), this series has been backcasted to 2001 by combining weights 
from all-India CPI with inflation rates from for CPI (industrial workers) for the period 
prior to 2010. The sample period for estimation in this paper therefore starts from the 
quarter April-June 2001 (or later in some cases) and ends in the quarter ended March 
2016. All the data used in the paper are available in public domain, and have been 
accessed from a variety of sources. Data on domestic variables are from Reserve 
Bank of India’s database/publications, and Central Statistics Office. Data on 
international variables have been taken from International Monetary Fund (global 
exports, international crude oil prices, and commodity prices) and Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis (VIX, US federal funds rates, US yields and US consumer prices). 
Data on real effective exchange rate (CPI-based) for India are from Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Data series have been de-seasonalised using X12-ARIMA procedure, except 
for financial market and a few other variables (interest rates, nominal exchange rate, 
crude oil prices and minimum support prices) which have been used without 
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adjustment. Various gap terms (for example, output gap, real interest rate gap, real 
exchange rate gap, credit gap) have been computed as the log-difference (and 
multiplied by 100 to make them in percentage terms) of the (seasonally adjusted) 
actual series and its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series. Inflation rates and growth 
rates are computed as quarter-over-quarter (log) changes (and multiplied by 100 for 
percentage terms) and annualised, unless specified otherwise.  
Nominal policy interest rate is captured by the effective policy rate, following 
Patra and Kapur (2012a), in view of the operating rate shifting between repo rate and 
reverse repo rate for the earlier part of the sample period. Real interest rate is 
computed as the effective policy rate less the 4-quarter average of year-on-year CPI 
inflation, with the latter term being a proxy for expected inflation. The variable names 
and their description are provided in Table 1. The unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests) indicate that the null of unit root (non-stationarity) can 
be rejected for all variables except two at 10 per cent levels based on either of the two 
tests (Table 2). Equations with contemporaneous endogenous variables or with 
forward-looking variables as explanatory variables have been estimated through 
generalised method of moments (GMM) approach; in other cases, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) approach has been used8.  
IV. Empirical Results 
Starting with the IS curve, all the explanatory variables have the expected signs 
and satisfy the regression diagnostics: higher real interest rates, lower volume of bank 
credit, lower global demand, real exchange rate appreciation, higher oil prices and 
weak monsoon depress demand in both the industrial and the services sectors. As 
expected, estimates indicate relatively stronger impact of these variables on industrial 
activity vis-à-vis services activity. An increase of 100 bps in the real policy rate, ceteris 
paribus, can reduce domestic demand by 20-50 bps in the non-agricultural sector, 
while one percent appreciation of the real effective exchange rate can reduce domestic 
demand by 7-15 bps. On the other hand, one per cent higher global exports can boost 
domestic demand by 25-35 bps. Rainfall activity is found to affect not only agricultural 
activity but also demand in the non-agricultural sector, given the still substantial share 
of agricultural sector in overall GDP and an even more substantial share of workforce 
dependent upon the farm sector. Fiscal variables (such as revenue deficit or gross 
fiscal deficit, headline or cyclically adjusted) were also tried in the industry and services 
equations to capture the impact of government spending on activity; however, these 
did not turn out to be statistically significant. It is interesting to note that in the state-
level panel analysis in Wahi and Kapur (2018), higher capital outlays by the state 
governments boost output with a lag; in contrast, higher deficits were found to crowd 
out economic activity.  
                                                          
8 All data transformations, estimations and simulations have been undertaken in the software 
WinRATS (version 9.2). Model dynamics in response to various shocks have been estimated 
using IRIS and MATLAB. 
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YINDGAPt =  − 0.01 YINDGAPt−1 − 0.52 EFF_RGAPt−4 + 0.36 WEXPGAPt − 0.15 REERGAPt−1    
                        (0.1)                     (3.4)                      (3.8)                        (2.0) 
+  0.05  RAINt−3 −  0.20  RMINOILGAPt−1 +   0.25  RNFCGAPt−2 
                             (2.1)                   (5.5)                    (4.5)                        
R̅2 = 0.64; BP = 0.079;      LB-Q(4) = 0.41;  JB = 0.42 
 
 
 
YSERVGAPt = −0.06YSERVGAPt−1 − 0.20 EFF_RGAPt−1 + 0.25 WEXPGAPt 
                               (0.5)                             (3.1)                            (7.5)   
         −  0.07 REERGAPt−2 +  0.03 RAINt−1 − 0.07 RMINOILGAPt −  0.02 RMINOILGAPt−1 + 0.14  RNFCGAPt−2 
                    (2.6)                              (2.4)                      (3.4)                               (1.3)                           (5.2)            
             +  1.22 D2006Q1t +     1.09 D2011Q1t 
            (9.7)                      (6.4) 
R̅2 = 0.70; BP = 0.16;  LB-Q(4) = 0.28;  JB = 0.95 
 
 
YAGRIGAPt =   0.53 YAGRIGAPt−1 +  0.05  RAINt +  0.23  RAINt−1 +  4.16  D2007Q4t −  2.37  D2008Q1t 
                                   (7.2)                                  (2.9)                     (6.4)                      (20.3)                          (5.3) 
                              
R̅2 = 0.77; BP = 0.36;  LB-Q(4) = 0.21;  JB = 0.29 
 
All variable names, as noted earlier, are in Table 1. In all the regression results, 
figures in parenthesis are t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC)-corrected standard errors. The diagnostic tests reported - LB-Q, JB, 
and BP - are significance level (p-value) of Box-Pierce-Ljung Q-statistic for the null of 
no residual autocorrelation up to 4 lags, of Jarque-Bera test for the null of normality of 
residuals, and Breusch-Pagan (BP) test for the null of no heteroscedasticity of 
residuals, respectively. 
Turning to the inflation process, results confirm the role of persistence, excess 
demand conditions, exchange rate movements and oil prices in pushing core inflation. 
According to estimated coefficients, an output gap of one per cent (i.e., actual output 
exceeds potential output by one per cent) and a depreciation of 10 per cent of the 
domestic currency could increase core inflation by around 60 bps and 40 bps, 
respectively. An increase of 10 per cent in international crude oil prices increases core 
inflation by around 30 bps10. Sharp variations in core inflation were observed in 
quarters 2004:Q3, 2005:Q1, 2009:Q3, and 2010:Q1 on account of the upward 
adjustment in house rent allowances for government employees, and these are 
captured through appropriate dummies.  
 
                                                          
9 The p-value of the White test for the null of non-heteroscedasticity of residuals is 0.20.  
10 In view of the earlier noted wedge between domestic product prices and international crude 
oil prices due to delayed/incomplete pass-through over most of the sample period as also due 
to taxation changes, the estimates of the coefficients on global oil prices appear to be biased 
downwards. Drawing upon the estimates in Behera, Wahi and Kapur (2017), the equation is 
estimated by imposing the restriction that the sum of the oil coefficients is 0.03. In case of the 
food inflation equation, the coefficient is restricted to 0.02.   
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𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑡 = 0.62 𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐸𝑋𝐹𝐹4𝑄𝑡−1 + 0.38 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑇𝑡 +  0.61 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 0.04 𝐷4𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 
                                     (6.4)                                  (4.0)                             (4.2)                           (3.1) 
                            +  0.015 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡−1 +   0.015 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡−4 +   2.86 𝐷2004𝑄3𝑡 +   4.96 𝐷2005𝑄1𝑡  
                                (6.2)                             (5.9)                            (9.4)                          (17.3)        
                            + 9.04 𝐷2009𝑄3𝑡 +  7.86 𝐷2010𝑄1𝑡 +   9.33 𝐷2011𝑄1𝑡 −   7.07 𝐷2012𝑄1𝑡  
                               (23.1)                           (16.4)                          (20.6)                           (7.8) 
R̅2 = 0.77; 𝐵𝑃 = 0.54;            LB-Q(4) = 0.58;       JB = 0.43 
 
Moving to food inflation dynamics, higher minimum support prices and higher 
global food and oil prices impart upward pressure on domestic food inflation. 
Exchange rate movements also impact food inflation through their impact on the 
domestic currency prices of global food and oil prices (which enter the equation in 
rupee terms). Above normal rainfall has a soothing impact on food inflation, although 
the variable is not significant. As expected, food inflation is somewhat less persistent 
than core inflation in view of it being subject to recurrent supply shocks. In case of fuel 
group inflation, global crude oil prices (in rupee terms) are found to have a lagged 
impact11.   
 
𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 0.34 𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑡−1 +   0.13 𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑡−2 +   0.53 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑇𝑡  −  0.10 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡  
                                      (2.7)                                      (1.4)                                          (3.0)                          (1.1) 
+  0.05 𝐷4𝐿𝑊𝐹𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 +  0.12 𝐷4𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 +  0.02 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑡−4                                             
(1.9)                                       (2.5)                                                   
   −  5.99 𝐷2010𝑄1𝑡   +  10.17 𝐷2011𝑄1𝑡   −   18.59 𝐷2011𝑄2𝑡 −    15.81 𝐷2014𝑄1𝑡  
                                    (2.2)  (9.3)                                (9.6)   (9.7) 
R̅2 = 0.39; 𝐵𝑃 = 0.24; LB-Q(4) = 0.34;         JB = 0.73 
 
𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑡 = 0.57 𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿4𝑄𝑡−1 +   0.43 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑇𝑡  +  0.05 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑡−4 
                           (3.2)                              (2.4)                            (3.5) 
R̅2 = 0.54; 𝐵𝑃= 0.44; LB-Q(4) = 0.31;         JB = 0.66 
 
An accurate empirical assessment of the monetary policy reaction function in 
terms of CPI inflation, as noted earlier, is hindered by the fact that the conduct and 
formulation of monetary policy over most of the sample period was largely conditioned 
by movements in WPI inflation. The Taylor-like rule using WPI inflation has the correct 
signs and also satisfies the Taylor-principle of long-run coefficient on the inflation gap 
being above unity12. In view of these empirical issues, the central bank’s reaction to 
the CPI inflation is assumed to be the same as was the case with the WPI inflation 
and therefore the coefficients from the WPI-based reaction function are used. This 
                                                          
11 The sample period for the fuel inflation equation is 2011-2016. 
12 The equation is estimated by GMM approach, with 2 lags of the following variables as 
instruments: EFF, GDPRGAP, WEXPRGAP, DALCPIIWGAP, DALWPIGAP, DALWNFUEL, 
DALOIL, D4LEXCH, DALNFC, and FEDTARGET. The foreign exchange market pressure in 
the aftermath of the taper tantrum led to a large, temporary increase in the marginal standing 
facility rate (and hence the effective policy rate) in July 2013 and this was rolled back in a 
phased manner in September-October 2013. This impact is captured through a dummy for 
2013:Q3. 
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approach is admittedly naïve, and as a robustness test, the model dynamics are also 
assessed in response to alternative reaction functions later on in this section.  
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡 = 0.54 +  0.17 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑃𝐼𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡+1 +  0.09 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡+1 +  0.88 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 
         (4.8)     (10.4)                                (2.5)                               (41.7)             
             + 0.10 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑡 +   3.31 𝐷2013𝑄3𝑡 
               (4.9)  (9.7) 
J stat (p-value) = 0.73; 𝐵𝑃 = 0.10;   LB-Q(4) = 0.04;  JB = 0.00 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡 = 0.54 +  0.17 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡+1 +  0.09 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡+1 +  0.88 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 +  0.10 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑡  
                      +   3.31 𝐷2013𝑄3𝑡  
       
On exchange rate dynamics, regression estimates indicate that higher relative 
domestic inflation as also higher global financial market volatility (captured by VIX) put 
depreciation pressure on the domestic currency, while higher capital flows impart an 
appreciation pressure, consistent with conventional wisdom13.  
 
𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡 = 0.34 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +  0.11 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡−2 −  0.27 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡−3 +  0.82 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑡−3                    
               (4.6)                              (1.2)                      (3.4)                            (7.3) 
− 0.15 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡  +  0.05 𝐷𝐿𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  +  0.02 𝐷𝐿𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1  
                       (2.8)         (3.6)                         (2.3)  
 
J stat (p-value) = 0.71; 𝐵𝑃 = 0.0614;  LB-Q(4) = 0.47;  JB = 0.19 
 
Moving to the external sector block, the current account balance (CAB) shows 
a deterioration on the back of higher domestic industrial activity, real appreciation and 
higher global crude oil prices; on the other hand, higher global demand leads to an 
improvement in the CAB15. Estimates indicate that one percentage point higher global 
growth, ceteris paribus, improves the CAB (i.e., increases the surplus or reduces the 
deficit) by around 0.2 per cent of GDP over the long-run, while a similar order of 
increase in domestic industrial activity reduces CAB (i.e., widens the deficit) by around 
0.3 per cent of GDP.  
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑡 =    0.09  +   0.89 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑡−1 −  0.03 𝐷4𝐿𝑌𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−3 +   0.02 𝐷4𝐿𝑊𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝑡−3 
                        (0.4)        (14.0)                     (2.2)                    (2.1)   
                  −   0.05 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡−5 − 0.01 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 − 4.87 𝐷2004𝑄3𝑡  +   2.76 𝐷2013𝑄3𝑡  
                         (2.0)                             (3.5)                                (14.3)              (7.2) 
?̅?2 = 0.75; 𝐵𝑃 = 0.75;  LB-Q(4) = 0.22;  JB = 0.96 
 
Net capital flows are found to respond to both push and pull factors on the 
expected lines. Higher domestic growth, and higher domestic interest rates are 
associated with higher capital flows, while domestic currency depreciation reduces 
                                                          
13 The equation is estimated using the GMM approach, with 2 lags of DLRP, REERGAP, CAB, 
CAP, DLOILAVG, DLVIX and 4 lags of DLEXCH as instruments: 
14 The p-value of the White test for the null of non-heteroscedasticity of residuals is 0.20.  
15 Restrictions on gold imports were imposed in the third quarter of 2013 to manage the foreign 
exchange market volatility after the taper episode, leading to a sharp reduction in the current 
account deficit and a dummy is accordingly included. 
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capital flows16. Point estimates suggest that the impact effect of one percentage point 
higher domestic growth or higher domestic interest rate each is an increase of capital 
flows of around 0.3-0.4 per cent of GDP.  
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡 =  − 1.33 +  0.29 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 +   0.43 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑡  −  0.07 𝐷4𝐿𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑡   
                         (3.0)      (4.6)                          (4.7)                       (7.0) 
                      +   0.29 𝐷𝐴𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡  + 5.24 𝐷2004𝑄4𝑡  + 6.83 𝐷2007𝑄3𝑡  
                            (4.3)                           (2.8)                          (4.2) 
J stat  (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)= 0.94; BP = 0.38;  LB-Q(4) = 0.69;  JB = 0.60 
 
Moving to the fiscal block, higher domestic non-agricultural activity is found to 
reduce primary revenue deficit, while higher domestic inflation, higher crude oil prices 
and rainfall deficiency widen the deficit17. According to point estimates, lower inflation 
might be more conducive for fiscal consolidation than higher growth: the deficit 
widening associated with one percentage point higher inflation (0.23 per cent of GDP) 
is more than the deficit reduction associated with one percentage point higher growth 
(0.13 per cent of GDP)18. Interest payments, as expected, move higher in tandem with 
the government’s borrowing costs. 
𝑃𝑅𝐷𝑡 =  − 0.72 +  0.32 𝑃𝑅𝐷𝑡−1 −  0.05 𝐷4𝐿𝑌𝑁𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑡 − 0.08 𝐷4𝐿𝑌𝑁𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 
   (2.4)          (7.7)                       (2.9)                             (4.8) 
  + 0.23 𝐷4𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡  + 0.004 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝐸_𝑍𝑡 +  0.005 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝐸_𝑍𝑡−3 + 0.61 𝑄2𝑡  
            (8.0)                      (1.2)                                (3.0)                                    (3.6) 
  − 0.06 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡  −  0.10 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−4 +   3.46 𝐷2008𝑄4𝑡  −   4.12 𝐷2010𝑄2𝑡  
         (2.9)                   (6.8)                        (4.0)                         (4.3)                          
SEE = 1.2;  J stat = 0.88;  𝐵𝑃 = 0.26;   LB-Q(4) = 0.84;  JB = 0.52 
 
 
𝐼𝑃𝑡 =  − 1.06    + 0.60 𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 +  0.03 𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵𝑡−1 + 0.11 𝐺10𝑌16𝑄𝑡−1 − 0.41 𝐷2003𝑄2 + 0.12 𝐷2014𝑄1 
            (4.5)        (6.9)                (4.3)              (5.1)       (13.4)   (7.4)              
+0.22 𝐷2014𝑄2 
 (15.1) 
?̅?2 = 0.98  𝐵𝑃= 0.0719; LB-Q(4) = 0.89;  JB = 0.16 
 
As regards bond yields, monetary tightening (policy rate and/or cash reserve 
ratio), as expected, tends to increase the yields, with the impact being substantially 
less than one-to-one consistent with the term structure hypothesis. An increase in 
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) results in a lowering of yields, since a higher SLR 
increases demand for government bonds. Higher borrowing requirements tend to 
                                                          
16 The equation is estimated using the GMM approach, with 4 lags of INTDIF, D4LEXCH, CAP, 
D4LVIX, and DALGDPR as instruments. Around the onset of the sub-prime crisis in the US, 
India experienced a spurt in capital flows, which is captured through a dummy for 2007:Q3. 
17 The equation is estimated using the GMM approach, with 4 lags each of PRD, D4LOILRE_Z, 
RAIN, D4LGDPW, EFF_RGAP, and 2 lags of D4LYNAGR and D4LCPI as instruments. 
18 A dummy for 2008:Q4 is included to account for the increase in the deficit due to the 
implementation of the 6th Pay Commission and the aftermath of the Lehman collapse, while 
a dummy for 2010:Q2 reflects the sharp reduction in the deficit on the back of large telecom 
auction proceeds. 
19 The p-value of the White test for the null of non-heteroscedasticity of residuals is 0.14.  
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harden yields. Higher investments by non-residents in government bonds soften 
yields. Domestic bond yields are also found to co-move with the US yields, suggesting 
a role for a global financial cycle. 
𝐷𝐺10𝑌𝑡  =   −  0.17  + 0.11 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑡  + 0.23 𝐷𝐺10𝑌𝑡−2 +  0.39 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡  −  0.  31 𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 
               (2.1)     (2.5)                     (3.9)                           (6.0)                    (2.6) 
                            +   0.04 𝐺𝑀𝐵𝑡  −   0.27 𝐹𝐼𝐼_𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 +  0.002 𝐷4𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑡  +  0.22 𝐷𝑈𝑆𝐺1𝑡  
                                (2.9)                    (5.1)                                (3.6)                               (2.5) 
     −  0.61 𝐷2002𝑄4𝑡      +    0.35 𝐷2015𝑄1𝑡   
                         (15.8)  (3.3)                       
 ?̅?2 = 0.78;   𝐵𝑃 = 0.57;  LB-Q(4) = 0.79;  JB = 0.65 
 
Turning to the banking sector dynamics, higher domestic economic activity is 
found to increase demand for real non-food bank credit, with the long-run elasticity of 
close to unity. Higher real interest rates and higher non-performing assets depress 
credit growth. Both supply and demand channels seem to be at play in the evolution 
of bank credit (Rajan, 2016): an increased risk aversion by banks in the face of higher 
NPAs and associated provisioning requirements can lead to lower credit supply, while 
weaker demand for credit from firms saddled with high NPAs as such firms deleverage 
their balance sheets can lead to lower demand. Regression estimates for NPAs 
(including restructured assets) indicate that higher credit growth can lead to a lagged 
increase in NPAs increase, while higher GDP growth helps to contain NPAs.  
𝐷𝐿𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑡 = 0.36 + 0.22 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑡−1 + 0.38 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑡−2 
        (1.0)          (1.6)                        (3.0) 
                  +   0.36 𝐷𝐿𝑌𝑁𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑡−2 − 0.62 𝐷𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 − 0.32 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑡−1 + 0.03 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑅𝑡−4 − 3.62 𝐷2009𝑄1𝑡  
                        (2.5)                                (2.5)                               (1.7)                        (2.0)                    (4.6) 
?̅?2 = 0.63;  𝐵𝑃 = 0.35; LB-Q(4) = 0.77;          JB = 0.01 
 
 
𝐷𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑡 = 0.90 + 0.06 𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−4 − 0.05 𝐷4𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡−3 − 0.07 𝐷4𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑡−4 + 0.12 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑡−3 
                                 (5.7)       (3.0)     (4.0)                                (6.1)                                (2.8)  
+ 1.21 𝐷2012𝑄1 − 0.97 𝐷2013𝑄1𝑡  
           (11.3)           (8.3) 
?̅?2 = 0.45; BP = 0.79;  LB-Q(4) = 0.88;          JB = 0.01 
 
V. Model Performance, Properties and Simulations 
Model Performance 
In order to assess the interlinkages and feedback across variables and 
equations, all the above estimated equations are grouped in a model, with appropriate 
identities to capture the interactions. The performance of the baseline model is 
satisfactory: it is able to capture the dynamics of the data and the inter-linkages 
relatively well in static simulations (i.e., one-quarter ahead forecasts) over the sample 
period (2005-16) (Chart 1).  Dynamic simulations are a relatively stricter metric to 
evaluate a model’s performance. Such dynamic simulations20 for forecasts up to 12-
quarters ahead, presented in Chart 2, also suggest a satisfactory performance, with 
forecast errors for most variables exhibiting a self-correcting behaviour. There are 
                                                          
20 Dynamic simulations use the actual path of policy repo rate and exchange rate. 
21 
 
some exceptions, such as forecasts of core inflation, where the dynamic forecast is 
not able to capture the initial sharp disinflation experienced in 2014, while food inflation 
is estimated higher by the model.   
A formal analysis of the model’s dynamic forecasting performance at various 
horizons can be done through Theil’s U statistics - which compare the performance of 
the model variables against the benchmark of a random walk model (i.e., a no-change 
model) by examining ratios of their respective root mean square errors (RMSE). A 
value of Theil’s U less than one for a variable indicates that the model improves over 
the naïve random walk specification. On this criteria, the model again does a 
reasonably good job. Theil’s U statistics for one-, four- and eight-quarter ahead 
forecasts are below unity for key variables with one exception (8-quarter ahead 
forecast for 10-year G-sec yield) (Table 3). Moreover, for most variables, the Theil’s 
statistic for the eight-quarter ahead forecast is less than the corresponding one-quarter 
ahead statistic. This indicates that the model’s forecasting performance improves over 
the medium-term horizon and imparts a degree of confidence in the model’s short- 
and medium-term dynamics.  
 
Model Properties 
The impact of various variables has been discussed in an individual equation 
framework earlier. In this sub-section, we discuss the impact and dynamics taking into 
account various interlinkages across equations and present results for a few important 
shocks. Starting with dynamics of the system to a 100 bps policy rate shock, the peak 
decline of about 25 bps in overall GDP takes after four quarters (Chart 3). The output 
gradually returns to the baseline consistent with the hump-shaped pattern in various 
studies. The decline in domestic demand and output reflects the effect not only of 
higher interest rates but also through the impact of interest rates on capital flows and 
exchange rate and in turn on net exports. Core inflation falls in response to lower 
domestic demand as well as exchange rate movements; the peak decline of around 
20 bps in core inflation (and around 10 bps in overall CPI inflation) occurs 4 years after 
the policy shock. The impact of interest rate on output and inflation is broadly similar 
to Benes et al. (2016). A tighter monetary policy impacts other variables in the model 
through the following channels: (a) a temporary nominal appreciation of the currency 
on the back of higher capital flows, (b) some improvement in the current account 
balance in view of lower domestic activity, and (c) an initial increase in bond yields (in 
consonance with higher policy rate) and fiscal deficit, but a subsequent reduction in 
tandem with lower inflation. Given the observed high persistence (indicated by the 
coefficient on the lagged interest rate) in the estimated policy rate reaction function, 
the policy rate returns to the baseline gradually after 4 years. 
Turning to dynamics in the aftermath of an exchange rate shock, the key 
propagation channels in the model are: Nominal exchange rate depreciation leads to 
higher prices of imported goods and hence higher domestic inflation, which 
necessitates some monetary tightening (and has a lagged negative impact on output). 
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Given short-run price stickiness, nominal depreciation also translates into some real 
depreciation for a while (and hence a lagged positive impact on net exports and 
output). An initial depreciation leads to capital outflows, which puts further depreciation 
pressure on the currency. Reflective of these interactions, a one per cent temporary 
depreciation (and reversed next quarter) of the Indian rupee (vis-à-vis the US dollar) 
leads to a peak increase of almost 5 bps in the headline CPI inflation rate after 2-3 
quarters, indicating an exchange rate pass-through coefficient of 0.05. There is also a 
modest, temporary increase in GDP growth rate, and an improvement in the current 
account balance (Chart 4). On the other hand, a persistent one per cent depreciation 
to the level of the exchange rate has a higher impact on inflation, and the exchange 
rate pass-through coefficient is estimated at around 0.1. One caveat is that the model 
does not explicitly factor in the possible headwinds from the balance sheet channel of 
the exchange rate discussed earlier (BIS, 2016). This channel is, however, implicitly 
present in the model, as the empirical regression results are driven by actual data 
dynamics over the sample period and can be viewed as capturing the net effect of 
both the trade and balance sheet channels. It would, however, be useful to incorporate 
such an effect explicitly in future research for a better and robust understanding of the 
dynamics.   
 
Model Simulations: Alternative Monetary Rules 
In view of the earlier noted estimation challenges from the regime shift towards 
a CPI-based framework, this section assesses model dynamics using monetary policy 
reaction functions employed in two recent studies –Benes et al. (2016) (dubbed “QPM” 
rule in the discussion below) and Patra et al. (2017) (dubbed “PKG” rule). The reaction 
function in Benes et al. responds both to deviations of headline and core inflation from 
the policy target, with more aggressive response to core inflation. Patra et al. (2017) 
endeavour for an “optimal” policy rule in a framework that minimises the central bank’s 
quadratic loss-function framework, i.e., minimises deviations of output and inflation 
from policy objectives. The optimal rule in PKG puts a substantially lesser weight on 
interest rate smoothing compared to the literature. Moreover, the ratio of weight on 
output gap to inflation gap as well as the individual coefficients on these two terms is 
also notably higher than the standard Taylor rule. The “estimated rule” (i.e., the 
monetary policy reaction estimated earlier on in this section) is reproduced below 
along with the QPM and PKG rule equations for comparison (in the equations below, 
‘rstar’ is nominal neutral policy rate, which is taken as 6 per cent purely for a 
comparative analysis of the three rules; and, DALCPIGAP and DLACPIEXFFGAP are 
deviations of actual headline and core inflation from the target)21.  
 
 
                                                          
21 Amongst the various possible candidate versions considered in Patra et al. (2017), we 
consider the scenario which minimises the objective loss function in Table 3 (page 362) of 
their paper, i.e., the rule with coefficients 0.40, 1.51 and 1.77 on lagged interest rate, output 
gap and inflation gap.  
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EFF = 0.88*EFFt-1 + (1-0.88)*[(rstar + 1.36*DALCPIGAPt+1 + 0.78*GDPRGAPt+1 + 0.80*FEDTARGET)]
          (Estimated Rule) 
 
EFF = 0.85*EFFt-1 + (1-0.85)*(rstar+ 0.5*DALCPIGAPt+3 + 2.5*DALCPIEXFFGAPt+3 + 0.5*GDPRGAP) 
          (QPM Rule) 
 
EFF = 0.4*EFFt-1 + (1-0.4)*(rstar + 2.95*DALCPIGAP + 2.52*GDPRGAP)  (PKG Rule) 
 
We restrict the comparative performance of the three rules to a few policy 
relevant shocks. Starting with the responses to an interest rate shock, an initial interest 
rate increase of 100 bps leads to lesser impact on both output and inflation in the PKG 
rule model compared to other models (Chart 5): the key driving force for this result is 
that the interest rate returns relatively quickly to the baseline in the PKG set up (given 
its lower persistence) and hence the magnitude of the impact on output and inflation 
is lower than the other rules. This outcome is consistent with a priori restriction that 
Patra et al. (2017) impose on their optimal rule: minimise deviations of output and 
inflation from the objectives. The comparative dynamics therefore suggest that a 
desired disinflation goal would need a higher initial tightening in the PKG rule 
compared to the other two rules. The impact on inflation and output is more persistent 
as well as protracted in the “estimated” rule.22 
Turning to a shock to core inflation, it attracts the strongest interest rate 
response under the PKG rule, given its high weight on the overall inflation gap. Hence, 
core inflation as well as overall inflation and output gap return relatively quickly to the 
baseline relative to the two other rules (Chart 6). Real interest rate turns positive 
quickly in the PKG and QPM rules, whereas it remains in the negative territory for a 
considerable period of time in the estimated rule. A corollary of these dynamics is 
somewhat larger negative output gap in the PKG and QPM rules.  
Moving to comparative dynamics in response to a demand shock, the initial 
interest rate response is more aggressive in the PKG rule (since it puts more weight 
on output gap compared to other rules), while the path is more persistent under the 
QPM rule.  Headline inflation returns to the baseline faster in the PKG and the QPM 
rules vis-à-vis the “estimated” rule (Chart 7). 
Overall, all the three rules considered in this paper have the desirable feature 
of stabilising inflation as well as output, but given their design features highlight the 
issue of policy preferences and policy trade-offs. Of course, no central bank or its 
monetary policy committee members follow monetary policy rules mechanically, since 
these are “too simple, and ignore important complexities” (Yellen, 2015).  There is also 
a view that simple rules are frequently more robust across models than fully optimal 
rules (Taylor and Williams, 2011). Moreover, as Goodfriend and King (2016, page. 91) 
                                                          
22 This comparative exercise has been attempted by using alternative monetary policy rules, 
while keeping the remaining model structure. The comparative performance of the rules 
considered here could differ across alternative models of the economy.  
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caution: “Monetary policy cannot be reduced to the automatic application of one 
specific model. Choosing the so-called optimal policy in a misspecified model can lead 
to serious mistakes. Alternative “models” of the economy must be considered and 
judgement used”.   
 
VI. Concluding Observations 
With the introduction of flexible inflation targeting in India beginning 2014 and 
the switch to consumer price index inflation as the nominal anchor for monetary policy, 
a renewed look at transmission dynamics assumes importance and this was the key 
objective of this paper. The paper undertook this exercise in a new Keynesian 
framework, with the model adapted to Indian conditions. Moreover, unlike most of the 
existing studies, the paper assessed transmission dynamics in a broader framework, 
by augmenting the monetary block with external, fiscal and banking sector blocks to 
capture feedback and interactions amongst key macroeconomic variables and 
policies.  
The paper’s empirical analysis indicates that monetary policy is effective in 
containing demand and inflationary pressures, and the effects are modest consistent 
with the existing cross-country and Indian evidence. A tight monetary policy and low 
inflation is also found to have a stabilising impact on fiscal dynamics. The model 
simulations suggest a satisfactory performance, and the forecasting performance 
generally improves as the forecast horizon is extended from one quarter to eight 
quarters. The paper also assessed transmission dynamics across a few alternative 
monetary policy rules to examine the role of policy preferences and their implications 
for output and inflation dynamics and policy trade-offs.  
The modelling approach pursued in the paper can be strengthened further in 
future work. For instance, first, output and demand dynamics can be analysed from 
the expenditure side of GDP (private consumption, government consumption, 
investment and net exports) in addition to the sectoral side (industry and services) 
approach in this paper. Second, bank credit growth has been modelled as a reduced 
form equation, capturing both demand and supply factors. It might be more useful to 
estimate separate equations for supply of bank credit and demand for bank credit in 
view of the recent stress in the banking system.  
The results in the paper are subject to the caveat of being model specific, as 
no one model captures all the relevant features of an economy or consistently beats 
other forecasts (Kent, 2016). Although models are useful in putting together consistent 
quantitative forecasts, they are based on strong assumptions and can act as no more 
than a starting point for a discussion of the challenges facing monetary policy at any 
particular juncture (Goodfriend and King, 2016). Moreover, the magnitude of the 
responses to various shocks and the associated lags reflect averages over the sample 
period, and the actual dynamics would depend upon the specific situation. While the 
paper’s model assumes a linear structure, the actual effects could be both asymmetric 
and non-linear, which are best examined in an individual equation framework.  
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Large shocks can lead to a deterioration in a model’s forecasting performance, 
as has been observed to be the case for major central banks in the Great Recession 
episode, and an ex-post analysis suggests that forecasting improvements are possible 
from a better incorporation of financial sector variables, including high-frequency data 
(Alessi et al., 2014). In view of the ongoing structural reforms, deregulation and 
opening up of the Indian economy, as well as ongoing initiatives to improve the efficacy 
of monetary transmission, the transmission dynamics can be expected to evolve over 
time. Finally, an additional caveat in interpreting this paper’s analysis is the monetary 
regime switch with the introduction of flexible inflation targeting, introduced only in 
2014: its implications for inflation expectations and monetary transmission would need 
to be re-assessed as more data become available and also across alternative 
modelling approaches.  
 
References 
Acharya, V.V., T. Eisert, C. Eufinger, and C.W. Hirsch (2016), “Whatever it Takes: The 
Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy”, Working Paper, New York University 
Stern School of Business. 
Acharya, Viral V. (2017), “Monetary Transmission in India: Why is it Important and 
Why hasn’t it Worked Well?”, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 12, pp.7-
16. 
Ahmed, Swarnali, Maximiliano Appendino and Michele Ruta (2015), “Global Value 
Chains and the Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports”, Working Paper No. WP/15/252, 
International Monetary Fund.   
Alessi, Lucia, Eric Ghysels, Luca Onorante, Richard Peach & Simon Potter (2014), 
“Central Bank Macroeconomic Forecasting during the Global Financial Crisis: The 
European Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Experiences”, Journal 
of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 32 (4), pp. 483-500, 
Anzuini, Alessio and Aviram Levy. (2007) “Monetary Policy Shocks in the New EU 
Members: A VAR Approach.” Applied Economics, 39, 1147–61. 
Ball, Laurence and Sandeep Mazumder (2015), “A Phillips Curve with Anchored 
Expectations and Short-Term Unemployment”, Working Paper WP/15/39, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Banerjee, Shesadri, Harendra Behera, Sanjib Bordoloi and Rakesh Kumar (2018), 
““Role of Financial Frictions in Monetary Policy Transmission in India”, Development 
Research Group Study 44, Reserve Bank of India. 
Bank for International Settlements (2016), 86th Annual Report. 
Barakchian, S. Mahdi and Christopher Crowe (2013), “Monetary Policy Matters: 
Evidence from New Shocks Data”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 60, pp. 950-
966. 
Bardsen, Gunnar, Ard den Reijer, Patrik Jonasson and Ragnar Nymoen (2011), 
“MOSES: Model of Swedish Economic Studies”, Working Paper Series No. 249, 
Sveriges Riksbank. 
26 
 
Behera, Harendra, Garima Wahi and Muneesh Kapur (2017), “Phillips Curve 
Relationship in India: Evidence from State-level Analysis”, Working Paper WPS 
(DEPR) 08/2017, Reserve Bank of India, July 2017 
Behera, Harendra, Sitikantha Pattanaik and Rajesh Kavediya (2015), “Natural Interest 
Rate: Assessing the Stance of India’s Monetary Policy under Uncertainty”, Working 
Paper 5, Reserve Bank of India.  
Baumeister, Christiane and Lutz Kilian (2016), “Lower Oil Prices and the U.S. 
Economy: Is This Time Different?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016, 
pp.287-357. 
Benes, J., K. Clinton, A. George, J. John, O. Kamenik, D. Laxton, P. Mitra, G.V. 
Nadhanael, H. Wang and F. Zhang (2016). “Inflation Forecast Targeting for India: An 
Outline of the Analytical Framework” (Mimeo). 
Bhoi, Barendra Kumar, Arghya Mitra, Jang Bahadur Singh and Gangadaran 
Sivaramakrishnan (2016), “Effectiveness of Alternative Channels of Monetary Policy 
Transmission: Some Evidence for India”, Mimeo 
Blanchard, Olivier, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence Summers (2015), “Inflation and 
Activity: Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications”, Working Paper 
WP/15/230, International Monetary Fund. 
Blanchard, Olivier (2016), “The Phillips Curve: Back to the ’60s?”, American Economic 
Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 106(5), pp. 31–34 
--- (2018), “On the Future of Macroeconomic Models”, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 34 (1-2), pp. 43-54 
Boivin, Jean, Michael Kiley and Frederic Mishkin (2011), “How Has the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism Evolved Over Time?” pp. 369-422, in Benjamin Friedman 
and Michael Woodford (ed.), “Handbook of Monetary Economics”, Volume 3A, 
Elsevier B.V. 
Borio, Claudio, and Haibin Zhu (2008), “Capital Regulation, Risk-taking and Monetary 
Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism?”, Working Paper 268, Bank 
for International Settlements. 
Catão, Luis, Douglas Laxton, and Adrian Pagan (2008), Monetary Transmission in an 
Emerging Targeter: The Case of Brazil, Working Paper WP/08/191, International 
Monetary Fund. 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans (1999), ““Monetary 
Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What End?” In Handbook of 
Macroeconomics, vol. 1A, edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Sci.  
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler (1998), “Monetary Policy Rules in 
Practice: Some International Evidence”, European Economic Review, Vol.42, 
pp.1033-1067. 
---- (1999), “The science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (4), December, pp. 1661-1707. 
---- (2000), “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some 
Theory”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, pp.147-180. 
27 
 
Coibion, Olivier (2012), “Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks Big or Small?”, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4(2), pp. 1-32 
Coibion, Olivier and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2012), “Why Are Target Interest Rate 
Changes so Persistent?”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4(4), 
pp. 126-162 
--- (2015): “Is the Phillips Curve Alive and Well After All? Inflation Expectations and 
the Missing Disinflation”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol 7(1), pp. 
197–232 
Cloyne, James and Patrick Hürtgen (2015), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Monetary 
Policy: A New Measure for the United Kingdom”, Working Paper 493, Bank of England. 
Dahlhaus, Tatjana (2017), “Conventional Monetary Policy Transmission during 
Financial Crises: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 32(2), 
pp.401-421. 
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Luc Laeven and Gustavo Suarez (2016), “Bank Leverage and 
Monetary Policy’s Risk-taking Channel: Evidence from the United States”, Working 
Paper 1903, European Central Bank. 
Disyatat, Piti and Pinnarat Vongsinsirikul (2003), “Monetary Policy and the 
Transmission Mechanism in Thailand”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 14 (3), pp. 
389–418 
Dhal, Sarat (2012), “Industry Effects of Monetary Transmission Mechanism in India: 
An Empirical Analysis of Use-based Industries”, Reserve Bank of India Occasional 
Papers, Vol. 32(2), pp. 39-79. 
Els, Peter van, Alberto Locarno, Benoît Mojon, and Julian Morgan (2003), “New 
Macroeconomic Evidence on Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area”, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 2/3, April-May, pp. 720-730. 
Fischer, Stanley (2015), “The Transmission of Exchange Rate Changes to Output and 
Inflation”, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20151112a.htm 
Forbes, Kristin (2015), “Much Ado about Something Important: How do Exchange 
Rate Movements Affect Inflation?”, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/839.aspx 
Fukunaga, Ichiro, Naoko Hara, Satoko Kojima, Yoicho Ueno and Shunichi Yoneyama 
(2011), “The Quarterly Japanese Economic Model (Q-JEM): 2011 Version”, Working 
Paper No.11-E-11, Bank of Japan.  
Gali, Jordi (2008), Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction 
to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Gali, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1999), "Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric 
Analysis", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 195-222. 
Gali, Jordi, Mark Gertler and David Lopez-Salido (2005), “Robustness of the Estimates 
of the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol.52(6), pp. 1107-18.  
García, Carlos, Pablo García, Igal Magendzo and Jorge E. Restrepo (2005), “The 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Chile: A Medium-Sized Macroeconometric 
28 
 
Model” in Rómulo Chumacero and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.), “General Equilibrium 
Models for the Chilean Economy”, Central Bank of Chile. 
Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi (2015), “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and 
Economic Activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 7(1), pp. 44–
76. 
Gervais, Olivier and Marc-André Gosselin (2014), “Analyzing and Forecasting the 
Canadian Economy through the LENS Model”, Technical Report 102, Bank of Canada.  
Goodfriend, Marvin and Mervyn King (2016), Review of the Riksbank’s Monetary 
Policy 2010-2015, available at http://data.riksdagen.se/dokument/RFR-201516-
RFR7.pdf 
Goodhart, Charles and Boris Hofmann (2005), “The IS Curve and Transmission of 
Monetary Policy: Is there a Puzzle?”, Applied Economics, Vol.37, pp.29-36. 
Gopinath, Gita (2015), “The International Price System”, Working Paper 21646, 
National Bureau of Economic Research  
Gordon, Robert (2011), “The History of the Phillips Curve: Consensus and Bifurcation”, 
Economica, Vo. 78, January, pp.10-50. 
--- (2013), “The Phillips Curve is Alive and Well: Inflation and the NAIRU during the 
Slow Recovery, Consensus and Bifurcation”, Working Paper 19390, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Hammersland, Roger and Cathrine Bolstad Traee (2012), “The Financial Accelerator 
and the Real Economy: A Small Macroeconometric Model for Norway with Financial 
Frictions", Staff Memo No. 2, Norges Bank. 
Havranek, Tomas and Marek Rusnak (2013), “Transmission Lags of Monetary Policy: 
A Meta-Analysis”, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 9(4), pp. 39-75 
International Monetary Fund (2015a), “Global Implications of Lower Oil Prices”, Staff 
Discussion Note, SDN/1515 
---- (2015b), “Exchange Rates and Trade Flows: Disconnected?” (Chapter 3), World 
Economic Outlook, October 
---- (2016a), World Economic Outlook, April 
---- (2016b), “Exchange Rate Pass-through in Latin America”, Regional Economic 
Outlook: Western Hemisphere, April 
Kapur, Muneesh (2013), “Revisiting the Phillips curve for India and Inflation 
Forecasting”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 17-27. 
Kapur, Muneesh and Michael Patra (2000), “The Price of Low Inflation”, RBI 
Occasional Papers, Volume 21 (2 and 3), Reserve Bank of India, pp. 191-233. 
Kapur, Muneesh and Rakesh Mohan (2014), “India’s Recent Macroeconomic 
Performance: An Assessment and Way Forward”, Working Paper WP/14/68, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Karapetyan, Artashes (2016),”The Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy in Norway”, 
Working Paper 5, Norges Bank 
Kent, Christopher (2016), Economic Forecasting at the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
available at http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2016/sp-ag-2016-04-06.html 
29 
 
Khundrakpam, Jeevan Kumar (2008), “Have Economic Reforms Affected Exchange 
Rate Pass-Through to Prices in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.43 (16), 
April 19, 2008, pp.71-79. 
--- (2012), “Estimating Impacts of Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand in India”, 
Working Paper 18, Reserve Bank of India. 
Kiley, Michael (2014), “The Aggregate Demand Effects of Short- and Long-Term 
Interest Rates”, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 10(4), pp. 69-104. 
Lahiri, Amartya and Urjit Patel (2016), “Challenges of Effective Monetary Policy in 
Emerging Economies”, Working Paper 1, Reserve Bank of India. 
Lees, Kirdan (2016), “Assessing Forecast Performance”, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 79 (10). 
Lewis, John (2016), “What can Big Data tell us about the Pass-through of Big 
Exchange Rate Changes?”, Working Paper 579, Bank of England. 
Li, Bin Grace, Stephen O’Connell, Christopher Adam, Andrew Berg, and Peter Montiel 
(2016), “VAR meets DSGE: Uncovering the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in 
Low-Income Countries”, Working Paper WP/16/90, International Monetary Fund. 
Mallick, Sushanta and Ricardo Sousa (2012), “Real Effects of Monetary Policy in 
Large Emerging Economies”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 16 (Supplement 2), pp. 
190–212 
Mavroeidis, Sophocles, Mikkel Plagborg-Moller, and James Stock (2014), “Empirical 
Evidence on Inflation Expectations in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 52(1), pp. 124–188. 
Mishra, Prachi, Peter Montiel, and Rajeswari Sengupta (2016), “Monetary 
Transmission in Developing Countries: Evidence from India”, Working Paper 8, Indira 
Gandhi Institute of Development Research. 
Mohan, Rakesh (2009), “Monetary Policy in a Globalised Economy”, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi. 
Mohanty, Deepak (2012), “Evidence on Interest Rate Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission in India”, Paper Presented at RBI’s Second International Research 
Conference, February 1-2, 2012, Mumbai 
(http://sirc.rbi.org.in/downloads/SIRCPaper.pdf) 
Olsen, Oystein (2011), “Monetary Policy and Inter-relationships in the Norwegian 
Economy”, Address at the Centre for Monetary Economics, September 5, available at: 
http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/published/speeches/2011/cme-lecture/ 
Paez-Farrell, Juan (2009), “Monetary Policy Rules in Theory and in Practice: Evidence 
from the UK and the US”, Applied Economics, Vol. 41(16), pp. 2037 —2046 
Patra, Michael and Muneesh Kapur (2012a), “A Monetary Policy Model for India”, 
Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Vol. 5(1), March, pp. 
16-39. 
Patra, Michael and Muneesh Kapur (2012b), “Alternative Monetary Policy Rules for 
India”, Working Paper WP/12/118, International Monetary Fund. 
Patra, Michael, Jeevan Khundrakpam, Asish George (2014), “Post-Global Crisis 
Inflation Dynamics in India: What has Changed?”, in Shah, Shekhar, Barry Bosworth 
30 
 
and Arvind Panagariya (ed), India Policy Forum 2013-14, Vol. 10, Sage Publications, 
New Delhi, pp. 117-191 
Patra, Michael, Jeevan Khundrakpam, and S. Gangadaran (2017), “The Quest for 
Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in India”, Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 39, pp. 349–
370. 
Patra, Michael, Jeevan Khundrakpam, and Joice John (2018), “Non-Linear, 
Asymmetric and Time-Varying Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Recent Evidence from 
India”, Working Paper WPS (DEPR): 02, Reserve Bank of India.  
 
Pruski, Jerzy and Piotr Szpunar (2008), “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism In 
Poland” in “Transmission Mechanisms For Monetary Policy In Emerging Market 
Economies”, BIS Papers No. 35, Bank for International Settlements. 
Ramey, Valerie (2016), “Macroeconomic Shocks and their Propagation”, Working 
Paper 21978, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Rajan, Raghuram (2016), “Resolving Stress in the Banking System”, Speech at 
ASSOCHAM – Interactive Meet with Industry & Trade, June 22, available at 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Speeches 
Reserve Bank of India (2004), Report on Currency and Finance 2003-04. 
--- (2013), “Real Interest Rate impact on Investment and Growth – What the Empirical 
Evidence for India Suggests?”,  
--- (2014), Report of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary 
Policy Framework (Chairman: Urjit R. Patel) 
--- (2016), Monetary Policy Report, October 
--- (2017), Report of the Internal Study Group to Review the Working of the Marginal 
Cost of Funds Based Lending Rate System (Chairman: Janak Raj), 
Romer, Christina and David Romer (2004), “A New Measure of Monetary Policy 
Shocks: Derivation and Implications,” American Economic Review, Vol. 94(4), pp. 
1055-84. 
Rudd, J. and Whelan (2007), “Modelling Inﬂation Dynamics: A Critical Review of 
Recent Research“, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to Vol.39(1), 
pp.155-170. 
Rudebusch, Glenn and Lars Svensson (1999), "Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting" in 
J.B. Taylor (ed.), “Monetary Policy Rules”, University of Chicago Press. 
Rudebusch, Glenn (2006), “Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction?”, International 
Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 2(4), pp. 85–135. 
Rusnak, Marek, Tomas Havranek, and Roman Horvath (2011), “How to Solve the 
Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 45(1), pp. 
37-70. 
Salunkhe, Bhavesh and Anuradha Patnaik (2018), “The IS Curve and Monetary Policy 
Transmission in India: A New Keynesian Perspective”, Margin - The Journal of Applied 
Economic Research, Vol.12(1), pp:41-66 
31 
 
Sidaoui, José J. and Manuel Ramos-Francia (2008), “The Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism in Mexico: Recent Developments” in “Transmission Mechanisms For 
Monetary Policy In Emerging Market Economies”, BIS Papers No. 35, Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Singh, Bhupal (2012), “How Important is the Stock Market Wealth Effect on 
Consumption in India?”, Empirical Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 915-927 
Sonna, Thangzason, Himanshu Joshi, Alice Sebastian and Upasana Sharma (2014), 
“Analytics of Food Inflation in India”, Working Paper 10, Reserve Bank of India 
Stein, Jeremy and Adi Sunderam (2016), “The Fed, the Bond Market, and Gradualism 
in Monetary Policy”, available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stein/files/gradualism_february_2016_final.pdf?m=14
55034472 
Taylor, J. B. (1993) “Discretion versus Rules in Practice”, Carnegie Rochester Series 
on Public Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 195–214. 
Taylor, John and John Williams (2011), “Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary 
Policy”, Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3B, Elsevier, 829-859. 
Ulvedal, Pål Bergset and Nikka Husom Vonen (2016), “Pass-through from Exchange 
Rate Movements to Consumer Prices”, Staff Memo 3, Norges Bank.  
Vonnák, Balázs (2008), “The Hungarian Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An 
Assessment” in “Transmission Mechanisms For Monetary Policy in Emerging Market 
Economies”, BIS Papers No. 35, Bank for International Settlements. 
Wahi, Garima and Muneesh Kapur (2018), “Economic Activity and its Determinants: 
A Panel Analysis of Indian States”, Working Paper WPS (DEPR) 04/2018, Reserve 
Bank of India 
Walsh, Carl (2010), “Monetary Theory and Policy”, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Willis, Jonathan and Guangye Cao (2015), “Has the U.S. Economy Become Less 
Interest Rate Sensitive?”, Federal Reserve Bank Of Kansas City, Economic Review, 
Second Quarter, pp. 5-36. 
Woodford, Michael (2003), “Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary 
Policy”, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Wren-Lewis, Simon (2018), “Ending the Microfoundations Hegemony”, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, Vol. 34 (1-2), pp. 55-69 
Yellen, Janet (2015), “Normalizing Monetary Policy: Prospects and Perspectives”, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150327a.htm 
 
 
  
32 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
Variable Name Explanation 
CAB Current account balance (% of GDP) 
CAP Capital account balance (% of GDP) 
D4LCPIEXFF Consumer price index inflation, excluding food and fuel (q/q,saar) 
D4LCPIEXFF4Q 4-quarter average of D4LCPIEXFF 
D4LCPIFOOD Consumer price index inflation, food group (q/q,saar) 
D4LCPIFUEL Consumer price index inflation, fuel group (q/q,saar) 
D4LCPIFUEL4Q 4-quarter average of D4LCPIFUEL 
D4LCPI Consumer price index inflation (q/q,saar)  
D4LEXCH Exchange rate (Indian rupee per US $) (q/q ar change) 
D4LGDPR Real GDP (q/q saar change) 
D4LMSPC Minimum support prices (q/q saar change) 
DLRNFC Real non-food bank credit (q/q saar change) 
D4LOIL International crude oil prices (in US$ terms) (q/q ar change) 
D4LOILR International crude oil prices (real) (q/q ar change) 
D4LOILRE International crude oil price (in rupee terms) (q/q ar change) 
D4LWEXPR World real exports (q/q saar change) 
D4LWFOODRE International food prices (in rupee terms) (q/q saar change) 
D4LYIND Industrial sector real GDP (q/q saar change) 
D4LYNAGR 
Real GDP excluding agriculture and ‘community, social and personal 
services’ (q/q saar change) 
DALCPIGAP Deviation of CPI inflation from target 
DALGDPR Real GDP (y/y change) 
DALOILAVGRE International crude oil price (in rupee terms) (y/y change) 
DALREER Real effective exchange rate (y/y change) 
DALWPIGAP Deviation of wholesale price index (WPI) inflation from target 
DCRR Cash reserve ratio (q/q change) 
DEFF Effective policy rate (q/q change) 
DEFF_R 
Effective policy rate, real (= Effective policy rate (nominal) less 4-quarter 
average of CPI inflation) (q/q change) 
DG10Y Yield on 10-year central government securities (q/q change) 
DGNPA_RA 
Gross non-performing and restructured assets (% of advances) of 
commercial banks (q/q change) 
DLRP Ratio of Indian CPI to the US CPI (q/q change) 
DLEXCH Exchange rate (Indian rupee per US $) (q/q change) 
DLVIX VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) (q/q change) 
DSLR Statutory liquidity ratio (q/q change) 
DLYNAGR 
Real GDP excluding agriculture and ‘community, social and personal 
services’ (q/q sa change) 
DUSG1 Yield on one-year G-sec of the US (q/q change) 
EFF Effective policy rate, nominal 
EFF_RGAP Effective policy rate, real, gap 
FEDTARGET Fed funds target rate 
FII_DEBT Net foreign portfolio investments in debt (% of GDP) 
G10Y16Q Yield on 10-year central government securities (16-quarter average) 
GDPRGAP Real GDP, gap 
GMB Central government market borrowings (% of GDP) 
INTDIF 
Difference between yields on 10-year government securities in India and 
the US 
IP Central government interest payments (% of GDP) 
Q2 Dummy variable for second quarter of each financial year (= 1 if it is Q2, 0 
otherwise)  
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RMINOILGAP Real domestic WPI minerals oil price index, gap 
RNFCGAP Real non-food bank credit, gap 
RAIN Deviation of rainfall from its normal level 
PRD 
Central government’s primary revenue deficit excluding interest payments 
(% of GDP) 
REERGAP Real effective exchange rate, gap 
LIAB Central government’s liabilities (% of GDP) 
WEXPGAP World real exports, gap 
YAGRIGAP Agricultural sector real GDP, gap 
YINDGAP Industrial sector real GDP, gap 
YSERVGAP Services sector real GDP excluding social and personal services’, gap 
Note: 
q/q = quarter-on-quarter change; y/y = year-on-year change; ar = annualised rate; saar = 
seasonally adjusted annualised rate. 
Real variables have been obtained by deflating nominal variables with CPI index (or, with CPI 
inflation in case of interest rate). 
Prefix L indicates natural log of a variable; Prefix D = first difference of a variable; Prefix DL = 
log-difference (multiplied by 100) of a variable, i.e., quarter-on-quarter (q/q) growth in per cent 
terms; Prefix D4L = q/q, annualized, growth in per cent terms; Prefix DAL = year-on-year (y/y) 
growth in per cent terms. 
Suffix GAP indicates the variable is in gap from, defined as log-difference (multiplied by 100) of 
actual series less its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series. DALCPIGAP is the deviation of CPI 
inflation from its target. 
Point dummy variables are denoted by ‘D’ followed by the specific quarter of a year for which it 
takes value 1, otherwise 0. [e.g. D2002Q2 takes 1 for second quarter of 2002 and 0 for rest of 
the period ] 
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Table 2: Unit Root Results 
Variable 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests 
Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests 
With constant With constant and 
trend 
With 
constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
Lags t-stat Lags t-stat t-stat t-stat 
CAB 0 -2.70 0 -3.03 -2.76 -3.12 
CAP 0 -4.25 0 -4.19 -4.36 -4.31 
D4LCPIEXFF 1 -2.89 1 -2.96 -6.13 -6.34 
D4LCPIEXFF4Q 0 -1.40 0 -1.30 -1.56 -1.53 
D4LCPIFOOD 0 -6.12 0 -6.43 -6.22 -6.53 
D4LCPIFUEL 0 -5.14 0 -5.08 -5.13 -5.12 
D4LCPIFUEL4Q 4 -1.56 4 -1.58 -2.61 -2.61 
D4LCPI 0 -5.50 0 -5.81 -5.69 -6.02 
D4LEXCH 0 -6.03 0 -6.20 -5.97 -6.23 
D4LGDPR 0 -8.59 0 -8.52 -8.57 -8.56 
D4LMSPC 2 -2.12 2 -2.13 -3.47 -3.50 
DLRNFC 1 -1.85 1 -2.73 -3.45 -4.41 
D4LOIL 0 -6.14 0 -6.26 -5.59 -5.92 
D4LOILR 0 -5.67 0 -5.86 -5.22 -5.62 
D4LOILRE 0 -6.42 0 -6.49 -5.87 -6.14 
D4LWEXPR 0 -5.07 0 -5.08 -4.80 -4.89 
D4LWFOODRE 0 -5.79 0 -5.74 -5.65 -5.67 
D4LYIND 0 -8.46 0 -8.44 -9.32 -9.32 
D4LYNAGR 0 -8.04 0 -7.99 -7.72 -7.73 
DALGDPR 0 -4.13 0 -4.04 -3.67 -3.66 
DALOILAVGRE 1 -4.26 1 -4.55 -2.70 -2.86 
DALREER 5 -3.25 5 -3.29 -3.28 -3.30 
DALWPIGAP 1 -3.12 1 -3.26 -1.69 -1.75 
DCRR 0 -6.36 0 -6.35 -6.42 -6.44 
DEFF 0 -6.15 0 -6.10 -6.18 -6.18 
DEFF_R 0 -5.60 0 -5.62 -5.59 -5.70 
DG10Y 0 -6.91 0 -6.98 -6.77 -6.84 
DGNPA_RA 0 -4.97 0 -5.55 -5.08 -5.65 
DLRP 0 -5.99 0 -6.64 -6.40 -7.08 
DLEXCH 0 -6.03 0 -6.20 -5.97 -6.23 
DLVIX 0 -8.33 0 -8.26 -8.52 -8.54 
DSLR 0 -5.12 0 -5.42 -4.98 -5.17 
DLYNAGR 3 -3.49 3 -3.50 -21.06 -21.08 
DUSG1 2 -2.61 2 -2.47 -4.60 -4.59 
EFF 0 -1.89 0 -2.27 -2.23 -2.66 
EFF_RGAP 1 -3.52     
FEDTARGET 1 -1.74 1 -2.21 -1.81 -1.89 
FII_DEBT 0 -4.68 0 -4.83 -4.65 -4.84 
G10Y16Q 0 -5.34 0 -4.16 -3.27 -2.88 
GDPRGAP 0 -5.42     
GMB 0 -6.19 0 -6.26 -5.79 -5.95 
INTDIF 0 -1.04 0 -3.79 -1.05 -3.55 
IP 0 -3.03 0 -5.54 -2.78 -6.08 
RMINOILGAP 0 -2.53         
RNFCGAP 2 -2.58     
RAIN 0 -8.28 0 -8.23 -8.39 -8.40 
PRD 0 -5.39 0 -5.35 -5.48 -5.48 
REERGAP 2 -4.81     
LIAB 0 -0.15 0 -2.82 -0.42 -2.78 
WEXPGAP 1 -5.48     
YAGRIGAP 2 -5.86     
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YINDGAP 0 -5.61     
YSERVGAP 0 -4.69     
Note: 
The columns titled “Lags” give the number of lags included in the ADF tests, with lag selection based 
on the Bayesian Information Criteria. PP tests include four lags. The ADF tests for variables in gap 
variables are without constant and trend.  
1%, 5% and 10% critical values for ADF tests (a) with constant are -3.51, -2.89 and -2.58, 
respectively, (b) with constant and trend are -4.04, -3.45 and -3.15, respectively, and (c) with neither 
constant nor trend are -2.60, -1.95 and -1.61, respectively, 
1%, 5% and 10% critical values for PP tests (a) with constant are -4.12, -3.48 and -3.17, respectively, 
and (b) with constant and trend are -3.54, -2.91 and -2.59, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 3: Model’s Forecasting Performance: Theil’s U 
Variable One-quarter ahead 
forecast 
Four-quarter ahead 
forecast 
Eight-quarter 
ahead forecast 
YAGRIGAP 0.71 0.52 0.41 
YINDGAP 0.62  0.58 0.39 
YSERV_XGAP 0.75 0.71  0.56 
GDPRGAP 0.69  0.73  0.50 
DALGDPR 0.58 0.61 0.55 
D4LCPIEXFF 0.65 0.54 0.45 
D4LCPIFOOD 0.44 0.49 0.55 
DALCPIEXFF 0.49 0.52 0.33 
DALCPIFOOD 0.45 0.76  0.76 
DALCPI 0.45 0.68 0.61 
DLEXCH 0.65 0.65 0.53 
DALNFC 0.66 0.64 0.44 
GNPA_RA 0.58 0.49 0.45 
CAP 0.79 0.63 0.75 
CAB 0.72 0.70 0.68 
PRD 0.71 0.89 0.60 
IP 0.69 0.34 0.33 
GFD 0.60 0.77 0.54 
G10Y 0.68 0.74  1.16 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 1: Model Performance: Static Simulations, 2005-2016 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 2: Model Performance: Dynamic Simulations, 2013-2016 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 3: Impact of 1 Percentage Point Increase in Policy Rate 
 
Note: y-axis indicates deviations from the baseline in percentage points and x-axis 
indicates period in years.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 4: Impact of 1 Per Cent Depreciation of Exchange Rate 
 
Note: y-axis indicates deviations from the baseline in percentage points and x-axis 
indicates period in years.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 5: Impact of 1 Percentage Point Shock to Policy Rate:  
Comparison Across Rules 
 
Note: y-axis indicates deviations from the baseline in percentage points and x-axis indicates 
period in years.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 6: Responses to 1 Percentage Point Shock to Core Inflation:  
Comparison Across Rules 
 
Note: y-axis indicates deviations from the baseline in percentage points and x-axis indicates 
period in years.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Chart 7: Responses to 1 Percentage Point Shock to Demand:  
Comparison Across Rules 
 
Note: y-axis indicates deviations from the baseline in percentage points and x-axis indicates 
period in years.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Annex I: 
Overall Monetary Transmission: Cross-Country Empirical Evidence 
Cross-country empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy impacts 
growth and inflation with long and variable lags (Annex Table 1). Illustratively, 
according to Christiano et al. (1999) – a benchmark study in the area and using the 
VAR methodology - an increase of 100 bps in the federal funds rate leads to a peak 
reduction of around 50 bps in output (GDP) after 6 quarters and a reduction of around 
40 bps in inflation after 12 quarters23. The selective survey in Annex Table 1 suggests 
a wide variation in lags as well as the quantum of the impact: ignoring the out-sized 
effects of the Romer and Romer (2004) study24, a 100 basis points (bps) tightening of 
interest rate shows a peak decline in output of 12-70 bps, with a lag of 1-10 quarters; 
the corresponding peak effect on inflation is 4-88 bps with a lag of 3-12 quarters.  
There is some evidence that monetary policy may have become less effective 
since the 1990s: the peak impact of a 100 bps fed funds rate tightening on industrial 
production using the VAR framework of Christiano et al. (1999) was 48 bps for the 
period 1965-1996, but only 20 bps for the period 1959-2007 (Ramey, 2016). Similarly, 
using the Romer and Romer (2004) narrative framework, the estimated impact on 
industrial output declines from 1.4 per cent during 1969-1996 to 0.8 per cent during 
1969-2007 (Annex Table 2). The changes in the monetary policy impact can be quite 
striking across different approaches, different assumptions and different sample 
periods (Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Coibion, 2012). 
Estimates of peak impact and lags are averages over the study periods and the 
actual impact of each monetary tightening/easing cycle on output and inflation could 
differ, depending upon the surrounding macroeconomic and financial environment as 
well as the evolving structure of the economy, the pace of the financial innovations 
and across models (Olsen, 2011). For example, the analysis for the US in Willis and 
Cao (2015) suggests a decline in the interest sensitivity of employment for nearly all 
industries and for the overall economy. They attribute the declining sensitivity, inter 
alia, to a weaker impact of short-term policy rate on long-rates.  
The relatively smaller impact of monetary policy on output and prices in Japan 
could perhaps be a reflection of the reduced efficacy of monetary policy in view of near 
zero policy interest rates since the mid-1990s (Fukunaga et al., 2011). More broadly, 
with policy rates in the vicinity of the zero lower bound in a number of advanced 
economies since 2009, the efficacy of monetary transmission through the conventional 
interest rate channel as well as through the unconventional channel (quantitative 
easing/large scale asset purchases) appears to be increasingly diminishing (BIS, 
2016).  
                                                          
23 These numbers are from their Figure 2 (column 1).   
24 The large effects in the Romer-Romer paper are driven by: (a) a stronger contractionary 
shock, (b) disproportionate effect during the reserves averaging period (1979-82), and (c) the 
use of longer lags in their specifications (Coibion, 2012). 
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Monetary policy impact may also depend upon financial conditions and be non-
linear: monetary policy has stronger and more persistent effects on macroeconomic 
variables such as output, consumption and investment during periods of high financial 
stress than during ‘normal’ times (Dahlhaus, 2017). Stronger effect during stress times 
suggests that balance sheet channel and bank-lending channel are at play. 
Acharya et al. (2015), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) and Karapetyan (2016) find 
evidence in support of the risk-taking channel in euro area, the US and Norway. The 
quality of lending – measured by the risk rating of new loans – goes down when 
monetary policy turns accommodative. Although the impact is statistically significant 
and robust, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) note that the economic magnitude is relatively 
small. On the role of the bank’s balance sheet strength and composition in inducing 
the risk-taking, Acharya et al. (2015) and Karapetyan (2016) find that less capitalized 
banks are more likely to increase loan volumes to ex-ante risky firms and indulge in 
ever-greening of bad loans and zombie lending, compared to more capitalized banks, 
consistent with the search for yield hypothesis. On the other hand, according to 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), risk taking is more pronounced for more capitalized banks, 
as equity owners of such banks might have a greater incentive to transfer risk onto its 
debt holders. 
As regards emerging economies, Mallick and Sousa (2012) find that 
contractionary monetary policy has a strong and negative effect on output in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa); tight monetary policy has the 
expected stabilising impact on inflation, albeit relatively moderate compared to the 
output effect and there is also some heterogeneity across the sample countries. 
Transmission lags may be relatively shorter in some EMEs, attributable to shorter 
maturity of domestic credit, and the considerable weight of the exchange rate in 
domestic currency pricing (Catão et al., 2008). Monetary transmission may be effective 
in low income countries, although the VAR based studies may not be able to capture 
the dynamics, given the limited time-series data available, measurement errors and 
large structural breaks (Li et al., 2016). 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of monetary transmission to prices (focusing 
only on studies using the VAR framework) is attempted by Havranek and Rusnak 
(2013) and Rusnak, Havranek and Horvath (2013). Havranek and Rusnak’s (2013) 
meta-analysis of 67 studies covering 30 countries finds: (a) the peak effect of a 
monetary policy shock on inflation occurs 29 months after the shock25, (b) the peak 
lag differs substantially across studies and countries, ranging from 11 months 
(Slovakia) to 51 months (Japan and France), (c) the peak effect lags are relatively 
longer in advanced economies (vis-à-vis transition countries), which suggests more 
financial development increases transmission lags, and, (d) the lags are typically 
longer is studies using quarterly data vis-à-vis studies using monthly data. The related 
meta-analysis by these authors (Rusnak, Havranek and Horvath, 2013) of 70 studies 
                                                          
25 The peak lag is substantially shorter (16 months) in hump-shaped impulses responses than 
that of around 50 months in strictly decreasing impulse responses.  
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covering 31 countries suggests a relatively faster pace of transmission: an increase of 
100 bps in interest rates leads to a peak decline of 33 bps in prices after 6 months, 
with the impact moderating to 22 bps after 12 months from the initial shock. The impact 
turns statistically insignificant after 13-14 months and reduces to 12 bps after 36 
months. The impact is stronger in more open economies, in countries with more 
independent central banks, and in economic downturns. The empirical findings of 
these two meta studies are somewhat puzzling and are not reconciled by the authors: 
the peak effect occurs after 29 months in Havranek and Rusnak (2013) and after just 
6 months in Rusnak, Havranek and Horvath (2013). One possible explanation for this 
might be different yardsticks in the two studies. The analysis in Rusnak, Havranek and 
Horvath (2013) is based on “best practice” studies, and the peak lag in Havranek and 
Rusnak (2013) reduces from 29 months for all the included studies to 16 months for 
the studies with hump-shaped impulse responses. This narrows the gap between the 
peak lags in the two studies, but still remains substantial. 
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Annex II: 
Empirical Evidence on Overall Monetary Transmission for India:  
VAR and Related Studies 
According to the structural VAR (SVAR) model in Mohanty (2012), the peak 
effect on output takes with a lag of two quarters and that on inflation with a lag of three 
quarters. An assessment of the expenditure side GDP components in a VAR 
framework indicates that monetary policy has a strong impact on investment demand, 
while the impact on private consumption is subdued (Khundrakpam, 2012). Dhal 
(2012) studies the impact of interest rate across industry groups in a VAR framework 
and finds a relatively stronger effect of interest rates on capital goods and consumer 
durables relative to basic, intermediate and consumer non-durable goods, although 
definitive conclusions are hindered by wide asymptotic standard error bands. The 
effect of the stock market wealth shock on consumption demand in India is relatively 
small, given the low share of stock wealth in the household asset portfolio and its 
asymmetric distribution (Singh, 2012). Bhoi et al. (2016) employ ‘shutdown’ 
methodology in a VAR framework to study the relative importance of alternative 
channels of monetary policy transmission and find the interest rate channel to be the 
most dominant channel. In response to a shock to the operating target, the maximum 
decline in output growth occurs with a lag of 2-3 quarters, and that on inflation (both 
CPI and WPI) with a lag of 3-4 quarters.  
In emerging economies such as India, unique institutional details as well as the 
thinness of financial markets in the backdrop of increasing global integration can result 
in unstable and perverse monetary transmission. Frictions such as statutory liquidity 
ratio (SLR) and chronic fiscal deficits can, under some conditions, completely invert 
the monetary transmission mechanism: (a) when the SLR constraint binds, a reduction 
in the policy rate can end up raising lending spreads and a contraction, instead of an 
expansion, in the economy, and (b) an exogenous fiscal constraint and a binding SLR 
may result in inflation rising in response to a tight monetary policy (Lahiri and Patel, 
2016). Mishra et al. (2016) using a monthly VAR for the period 2001-2014 find some 
impact of monetary policy impulses on exchange rate and commercial banks’ lending 
rate but no impact on either output or inflation – the authors attribute the latter finding 
to either instability in monetary transmission or the limitations of the empirical 
methodology.  
Banerjee et al. (2018) focus on the role of financial frictions and structural 
rigidities in monetary transmission in a DSGE model with an imperfectly competitive 
banking sector at the core. Their results suggest that easing of the collateral constraint 
and greater financial inclusion can enhance the degree of transmission more than 
proportionately, and interest rate rigidity on the lending side is more critical than the 
rigidity on the deposit side. Targeting financial stability through monetary policy rule 
may not be appropriate for the purpose of economic stabilisation. 
The constant natural interest rate assumption implicit in Taylor type feedback 
rules could be misleading at times, in view of possible time-varying nature of the 
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natural interest rate (Behera, Pattanaik and Kavediya, 2015). Time-varying natural rate 
estimates suggest that the real interest rate gap (actual rate less the natural rate) was 
negative in India for a major part of 2005-15, implying that monetary policy stance was 
largely accommodative rather than anti-inflationary. 
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Annex Table 1: Monetary Policy Impact on Output and Inflation:  
Cross-country Survey 
(Impact of 100 basis points (bps) Increase in Interest Rate) 
No. Country Study and 
Modelling Approach 
Peak 
reduction 
in GDP 
(bps) 
Lag 
(quarters) 
Peak 
reduction 
in inflation 
(bps) 
Lag 
(quarters) 
1 USA Christiano et al. 
(1999) ; VAR (a) 
50 6 40 12 
2 USA Romer and Romer 
(2004) 
    
 Narrative plus 
regression 
430 (IP) 8 590 (PPI) 
360 (CPI) 
16 
 Narrative plus VAR 290 (IP) 8 500 (PPI) 16 
3 USA Boivin et al. (2011); 
DSGE (b) 
40 2 30 3 
4 Euro 
area 
Els et al. (2003); 
VAR and macro 
models 
30-70 8 20-40 3 
5 UK BoE (2000); macro 
model 
30 4 30 9 
6 UK Cloyne and 
Hürtgen (2015); 
Romer-Romer 
approach in VAR 
50 10 88 12 
7 Sweden Bardsen et al. 
(2011); DSGE 
50 6 20 6 
8 Norway Olsen, 2011; VAR 40-70 5-6 20-30 9-11 
 Olsen, 2011; DSGE 40 5 25 8 
9 Japan Fukunaga et al. 
(2011); macro 
model 
14 7 4 10 
10 Poland Pruski and Szpunar 
(2008) 
30 4 20 8 
11 Brazil Catao et al. (2008) 12 2 40 3 
12 Chile Garcia et al. (2005); 
macro model 
60 1 25 7 
13 Czech 
Republic 
Anzuini and Levy 
(2007); VAR 
16 (IP) 3 34 8 
14 Hungary 200 (IP) 1 80 11 
15 Poland 40 (IP) 3 30 5 
16 Thailand Disyatat and 
Vongsinsirikul 
(2003) 
41 4 12 12 
(a): based on their figure 2 (column 1). 
Note: IP: Industrial production; PPI: produce price index; CPI: consumer price index. 
Source: Respective studies. 
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Annex Table 2: Monetary Policy Effect on Output: Sensitivity Analysis 
Paper and Method Sample Period Trough Impact on 
Industrial Production of 
an Increase of 100 bps in 
the Federal Funds Rate 
(Per cent) 
(a) Christianio et al. (1999), VAR   
 1965m1 – 1996m6 -0.48 
 1959m1 – 
2007m12 
-0.20 
   
(b) Romer and Romer (2004)   
      (i) VAR 1969m3 – 
1996m12 
-1.38 
      (ii) VAR 1969m3 – 
2007m12 
-0.83 
      (iii) Jorda approach 1969m3 – 
1996m12 
-0.83 
      (iv) Jorda approach, no 
recursiveness 
1969m3 – 
1996m12 
-0.90 
   
(c) Gertler and Karadi (2015)   
      (i) Proxy SVAR 1990m1 – 2012m6 -2.2 
      (i) Jorda approach 1990m1 – 2012m6 -1.0, but then rises to +4 
   
Source: Ramey (2016, Table 3.2)   
 
